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THE GROWTH OF EXTREMISM AND THE FACTOR OF “INTELLECTUAL PARITY”

Gagik Harutyunyan^{*}

The global security today depends to a large extent on the developments in Middle East in the context of the Islamic State’s (*IS*) actions. However, the *IS* is just the tip of the iceberg; the Middle Eastern processes are closely related to what happens in Central and Southeast Asia and continental “yellow, hot Africa.” In addition, escalation due to actions of extremist groups occurs not only in these regions. In terms of a number of indicators the same logic applies to the events in Ukraine. It is no coincidence that the “Right Sector” combatants call themselves “Christian Taliban”, let alone numerous instances of collaboration between Ukrainian and Islamic extremists from some regions of Russia and CIS. The potential of extremism accumulates also in EU countries, so far in somewhat latent form. After a long period of tranquility, racial-based clashes resurged in the USA. There is an impression that a wave of extremism is engulfing the entire global space and there is every reason to believe that this phenomenon is a key sociopolitical trend.

Some analysts correlate these developments with the painful emergence of multipolar world, which occurs in the mode of a “Cold War 2”. A re-division of spheres of influence is accompanied by geopolitical shifts. At the same time, connecting the developments to geopolitics only is somewhat problematic, too.

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Problems of the “expropriation system”

Currently a peculiar insurrection happens against the pseudo-values based on financial profiteering model of economy that stimulates consuming instincts and makes them absolute, as a result of which a society guided by principles of social Darwinism is formed. It is only natural that in such societies democratic norms quickly devaluate, due to which the modern Western societies can be characterized as “post-democratic”¹. This situation was perhaps most accurately described by Alexander Panarin: “after the West won the Cold War, symptoms of Western civilization’s degeneration into a new global expropriation system became visible”².

It is known that such rebellious minds from both Muslim and Christian communities often join the ranks of extremist organizations. Protest movement, organizing which is impossible without modern information and communication means, is also directed against the system that has gained some traits of information totalitarianism. This is manifested by methodical “brainwashing” (which in a less politically correct manner is also called “global dumbing-down”) and mass wiretapping of everybody and everything, so that even George Orwell’s genius works pale in comparison. It is no so surprise that under such circumstances “dissident movement” emerge, somewhat reminiscent of the ones in Soviet Union, with some individual daredevils (Assange, Snowden, etc.) making stands and publishing “chronicles of actual events” in the totalitarian system. Many different and sophisticated methods are used to suppress the protest movement. However, the process is on and this resurrection sometimes quite

¹ Колин Крауч, Постдемократия, М.: Изд-во Государственного университета- Высшая школа экономики, 2010.

² Александр Панарин, Народ без элиты: между отчаянием и надеждой. «Наш современник», №11, 2001.

harmonically superimposes over the global military and political situation, making it even more complicated and unpredictable.

The problem of perceiving the complexity

It is no surprise that terms like turbulence, multidimensionality or even chaos are used to characterize the modern realities. Meanwhile, it seems that as in the Shakespearian hero's words, "though this be madness, yet there is method in't". That is the reason why today the problem of adequate perception and conceptualization of the realities is as important as it has never been before. With this axiom in mind we shall attempt to present our understanding of some of the mechanisms of what happens. In doing so we shall adopt an approach, which assumes that along with natural/evolutionary processes, the current "complexity" is also formed at least in part by directing actions of the power centers. Because of this very complexity of developments, some of the narrative below has to be treated as versions, but in no way conspiracy theory improvisations. It is our firm belief that only free and open discussions of this kind can bring to rational and pragmatic conclusions, which in turn may help find the answer to the eternal question of "what to do"?

Precedents of political extremism

In the information space one may encounter many allusions regarding the ties of intelligence services with terrorist groups, including Al Qaida and IS. This is nothing new: it is well known that radicals are a brutal force that governments and intelligence services of more or less influential countries always try to control and use. Yet it would be somewhat difficult to attribute the current widespread expansion of extremism and its transformation into a global geopolitical

factor only to some specific operations by intelligence services (however important they are). The logic of events at least indirectly allows suggesting a scenario of artificial and intentional spread of extremism, or at the minimum, an impact or factor of such thought-through plan in the unfolding developments.

Recently the anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany was celebrated. That war was also caused by rise of extremism: fascism and Nazism. There have been plenty of objective prerequisites for emergence of fascism ideology in Germany. As for racism, things are more complicated, as it is known that racism originated in Anglo-Saxon society. One fool always makes many, but some scholars suggest that the export and propagation of racist ideas into continental Europe was not really spontaneous. One way or another, fascism is now remembered only in historical context, whereas the thesis of one ethnicity's supremacy over others (or in somewhat different modification, of one religion over others) still thrives even today. The semantic viruses of own exceptionalism are embedded in the technologies of "color revolutions" and societies that carry out such revolutions readily get infected by them. The most recent example is Ukraine.

Therefore, there is every reason to assume that the epidemic of extremism today is a technologized opportunity to unleash conflicts in a manner that can be capitalized upon by the "infectors". For this, it is also sometimes useful even to "declare war on extremism". Military/political developments of recent years at the very least suggest such possibility.

“Smart technologies”, “think tanks” and “controlled chaos”

In the initial stage the traditional types of operations were carried out: Afghanistan and Iraq were bombed, occupied, etc. After that “smart technologies” were utilized. To implement policies in the Middle East, the USA extensively used the designs of RAND Corporation. Attention to outputs of this renowned think tank is very essential, especially in the context of understanding the “Middle Eastern complications”; here are just a few studies by RAND: *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies*¹, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*², etc. Obviously, it would be an exaggeration to attribute the successes of “Arab Spring” and “Euromaidan” only to Gene Sharp technologies. After all, these coups d'état (which incidentally, are classical examples of extremism) were based on deep knowledge of sociopolitical, ethnoreligious and psychological characteristics of a given country and society. And that is not all of it: RAND and Sharp may have provided the knowledge and technologies, i.e. the “tactical weapons”, but they were not the one who offered the political philosophy and ideology, i.e. the global strategy.

Just recently all analysts were talking about the “controlled chaos” in the Middle East. Some experts substantiated that this phenomenon is related to the concepts developed at the Santa Fe Institute, which is focused on interdisciplinarity and complex studies. Today this phrasing is used less frequently, which in our opinion is symptomatic, but we shall return to this later. Established with sponsorship of the Pentagon and Department of State, this institute was supposed to adapt the theory of chaos for applied geopolitical objectives. Character-

¹ Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies*, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1716.html.

² Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Peter Sickle, *Building Moderate Muslim Networks*, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG574.html>.

istically, one of the founders of the institute is Murray Gell-Mann, a renowned Nobel Prize winner physicist, while the main principles of its activities are based on the concepts on “order out of chaos”¹ by another Nobel Prize winner, Ilya Prigogine. Perhaps, the great scientists saw application of their ideas in real politics as a fun, at the same time pretty well-paid intellectual game (which is generally very characteristic to theorists in physics). It is harder to imagine, though, that they believed unconditionally in the universal nature of the laws of physics and thought that these laws would work in an unpredictable medium of the human society. We presume that participation of Zbigniew Brzezinski and other specialists of diplomacy and intelligence in the R&D activities played a decisive role in this. Less gifted by default in professional terms and guided by their geopolitical instincts, they could have forced an attempt to crossbreed politics and theoretical physics. If the world is a chessboard and geopolitics is subject to the rules of such game (it is sometimes useful to think, isn't it?), then why not use physics in politics... One way or another, the symbiosis was performed and the lexicon of political analysis was enriched by the phrasing “controlled chaos”, out of which the “new order” was supposed to emerge, as its authors believed.

Proxy-genocide

There were and are numerous objective military, socioeconomic and religious/confessional problems in the Middle East². It is also known that real politics are hardly ever humane. However, it seems that some modern political technologies, which often contain not entirely correct and too mechanistic theses devel-

¹ See for example: Пригожин И., Стенгерс И., Порядок из хаоса: Новый диалог человека с природой. – М.: Прогресс, 1986. – 432 с.

² See for example: Гагик Арутюнян, О некоторых вопросах стратегии США в контексте Иракской проблемы, 21-й век, #3(5), с. 105, 2004 (на армянском языке).

oped by think tanks, are particularly inhumane. They initiate and promote military/political and societal processes that lead to mass deaths and destruction of civilizational values. These technologies are quite politically correct in their narrative and seem to contain no elements of racism or fascism. Yet they have brought about a humanitarian catastrophe quite comparable with the one occurred during the World War I. Admittedly, the mechanisms in this case are far more sophisticated, as wars are made by the hands of others, or worded differently, by proxy.

For instance, the “news ticker genocide”¹ currently occurs in the Middle East, with 2 million casualties and over 15 million refugees so far. Genocide is accompanied by culturecide, and the Christian communities of the Middle East (including Armenians) are at the verge of extinction. All of this may seem to have no connection to those who have developed and applied dubious concepts like “controlled chaos”. The global community’s unresponsiveness to this mechanism of “proxy-genocide” is related to the well-developed preemptive information manipulation technique. For example, the whole Syria deal is presented as a civil war of the “civic opposition” against the dictator Assad. In order to suppress any possible protests of the proverbial global community (so as to avoid the precedent that took place during the Vietnam War) various methods are used. It sometimes even comes to wide distribution of drugs, which in principle can be characterized as a psychological warfare against own society². It is not improbable that fetishizing the ideas of same-sex marriage (especially against

¹ Гагик Арутюнян, Мультиполярные реалии, Ближний Восток и геноцид в режиме «бегущей строки», http://noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12307&spphrase_id=47943.

² Гагик Арутюнян, Информационные операции: история и современность, http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=13489&spphrase_id=47952.

the background of existing problems) is also aimed at dumbing-down the masses, along with similar technologies for control of masses. Meanwhile, it is absolutely clear that the genocide in the Middle East should be investigated in a format of international tribunal as a crime against humanity. And it should not be necessarily done by the Hague Tribunal.

Civilizational dimension

The intangible, information/psychological ramifications are not less dramatic. The very name of *IS* has inserted Islam's association with terrorism in the consciousness of the global community, which leads to bolstering of inter-civilizational antagonism in the spirit of Huntington's concepts.

In addition, in the context of developments taking place in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, relations between nations with common ethno-cultural background deteriorate as well. In particular, manipulation technologies used within the concept of "soft power" deform the "civilizational codes" of the societies that were previously considered close in spiritual terms. Meanwhile, loss of the own "civilizational coordinates" leads to great problems in almost all aspects of the life. Intolerance usually grows in such societies, sometimes evolving into a political and military conflict with their "own" people, as it happens in Ukraine. In this context it is important to develop both conceptual and organizational technologies (based on the networking principle) that would enable rebuilding the identity, as well as the civilizational commonality (and hence, the synergy needed for general development) of the artificially divided ethnic groups.

The political outcomes

It has to be admitted that the mentioned military/intellectual efforts have brought quite considerable results. Currently Eurasia is surrounded by a belt of instability (the infamous “Anaconda”), while radical groups are active in Russia and China, often not without success. In addition, Russia and Iran are drawn into conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen, respectively, while the oil and gas seized and sold by *IS* combatants add to the price decline for hydrocarbons, and so on, and so forth.

It would seem that all main geostrategic objectives have been achieved. Not quite, because some other physical principles interfered, which are much simpler and truly universal, such as Newton’s law that for every action there is reaction.

Russia and China in their own ways started opposing American plans and taking relevant measures. To a large extent thanks to a unique sociopolitical system Iran turned out immune against any sorts of color revolutions, and Syrian and Libyan nightmares were not replicated there. The Egyptian military rose against the revolutionary anarchy and restored the order in a considerable degree. In the context of “resistance” a number of countries started to coordinate their efforts in formats of SCO, BRICS and EAEU. Perhaps, these are the reasons why the wording “controlled chaos” is now less popular in the information space: after all, a lot of things point to the fact that “chaos” has slipped out of control and now functions under its own, unpredictable rules, as normally a true societal/human chaos should behave...

Against this backdrop some problems have appeared for the United States. At the time Paul Kennedy warned that “the sum total of the United States’

global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously" and he called this phenomenon an "imperial overstretch." In addition, this "overstretch" is accompanied by a typical "dizziness from success". Despite this, even an "overstretched" and "dizzy with success" America is able to accomplish a lot, especially given its superiority over all competitors in scientific innovation and military technologies.

Uncertainty of the prospects

According to the US Army Chief of Staff, ISIS fight is a 10-year problem¹, whereas earlier President Obama has stated it will take three years. Let us remember that it took just three weeks to defeat the Iraqi army in 2003. Interestingly, very few dare naming any dates in relation to the Ukraine conflict, but there are signs that the standoff is becoming chronic.

Growth of uncertainty in the new Cold War is caused among other things by the fact that the world has become a multicenter place. Unlike the previous cold war, in the current one there are not only several large geopolitical players, but also a number of influential transnational commercial corporations and NGOs. Each of them has their own ideas about the future (often quite vague ones) that naturally do not coincide. Due to these reasons it is truly difficult to come up with prognosis or correct future scenarios. Usually in such cases people turn to forecasts by *NIC*², but the impression is that this and other similar organizations have not yet sufficiently accounted for the factors of *IS*, Ukraine and global growth of extremism in their studies.

¹ *Army Chief Of Staff: Arab Forces Must 'Step Up,' ISIS Fight A '10-Year Problem'*,

<http://washington.cbslocal.com/2015/06/11/army-chief-of-staff-arab-forces-must-step-up-isis-fight-a-10-year-problem/>

² National Intelligence Council, Global Trends,

<http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-global-trends>.

If one attempts to extrapolate the modern realities into future, then as it was already mentioned, the main trend is the growth of extremism. This process has gained momentum also on the European continent in two parallel ways. First, it is the boomerang effect: streams of disgruntled refugees escaping “chaos” are fertile ground for all sorts of terrorist organizations, not to mention special *IS* envoys embedded among the refugees. Protest matures also among the ethnic Europeans for whom a threat to their survival as species is starting to materialize. In this context intuitive prophecies in fiction format¹ could pass for plausible prognoses.

Some conclusions

The above described trends do not contradict to the earlier forecasts according to which the world undergoes transformation, the integration around power centers gains momentum, yet in parallel fragmentation of global space occurs along the civilizational and other lines. Some scenarios suggest that the USA increasingly loses monopolistic positions, while others expect *Pax Americana* to last.

Feasibility of such scenarios depends not only and even not so much on economic and military strengths, but more on whether Russia, China and other countries would be able to compete with the superpower in the area of “smart political and organizational technologies”².

In this context the situation is comparable that of the mid-20th century, when leading countries could not be considered superpowers if they did not

¹ Елена Чудинова, Мечеть Парижской Богоматери. – М.: Изд-во: Яуза, Эксмо, Лепта-Пресс, 2005.

² See, for example: Гагик Арутюнян, Прогнозирование и формирование будущего, 21-й Век, #3(19), с.5, 2011, Гагик Арутюнян, История, информационные войны и интеллектуальный паритет, http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=13442.

have nuclear weapons. This is perceived especially acutely in China, where the State Council has adopted a resolution to create a number of think tanks. An objective is set that “some of them achieve global influence”¹.

It appears that a full-fledged multipolar world order is possible only when “intellectual parity” is achieved between the countries and relevant mechanisms are developed for “detering smart technologies”.

July, 2015

¹О развитии «мозговых центров» в КНР, Зарубежное военное обозрение, #4, с.92,2015.

THE CHALLENGES OF SMALL STATES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN THE POST-COLD-WAR PERIOD

*Arman Navasardian**

For millennia the Caucasus was a place where active trade and cultural ties were developed, diplomatic agreements were reached and military alliances were forged and dissolved. The Caucasus used to be a crucial part of the Great Silk Road, through which Europe was connected to Central and Western Asia. The trade route passing through South Caucasus, including Armenia was known since the times of Homer and Golden Fleece [1, p. 290]. Hence, since ages ago peoples and states not only fell out and warred with each other, but also were rational enough to cooperate in politics, trade and culture, thus paving the way for cooperation and integration for the coming generations.

However, the Transcaucasian nations' imperative to participate in the world politics and establishment of a new world order encounters some unsurmountable obstacles, because the region is tangled in political, economic, ideological, cultural and ethnic discords and conflicts, where "problematic socio-economic, ethno-territorial, religious, geopolitical and other interests intertwine"[2, c. 8].

After the collapse of the USSR the post-Cold War tectonic shifts engulfed also the South Caucasus, which stopped being just a sphere of Russian influence.

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New players appeared in the region: the US, EU, Turkey, Iran, and China. Also South Caucasus started to be viewed as a part of the Greater Middle East, with all that it entails. Consequently, big political games and combinations unfold, which threaten to turn the region into an epicenter of clash between those struggling for Caucasus, first of all the Atlantic and Eurasian interests. The balance of power between these two blocs is subject to change. By the end of the last century Russian positions significantly weakened here, while the US boosted its Caucasian policy vector. However, decisive and tough actions by V. Putin gradually change the realities. Russia “returns” to Caucasus. “The peaceful end of the Cold War, culminating in the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, signaled the final step in the rapid ascendance of the United States as the first truly global superpower. That internationally dominant power, together with its politically motivated and economically dynamic partner, the European Union, appeared capable not only of reviving the West’s global preeminence, but also of defining for itself a constructive global role. Twenty years later, few expect the European Union to emerge soon as a politically serious global player while America’s pre-eminent global status seems tenuous.” [3, c. 14] This is how pessimistic is the political future of European Union and the United States seen by Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most prominent political analysts of the time, who has been a staunch supporter of Western values and interests all his life. However, the weakening positions of the USA by no means suggest decreased interest in South Caucasus, which is “located on the crossroads of “political storms” from East and West, North and South. The newly established states of the region slowly turn from objects into subjects of international law. The Caucasus will remain for long in the focus of important interests of the classic hegemon states of the region: Russia, Turkey and Iran” [4, c. 13].

In the context of global changes in international relations, the three South Caucasus republics do not have uniform stances. Armenia is the strategic partner of Russia and member of EAEU, and develops parallel bilateral relations with Iran, USA and EU. After the Turkish-Azerbaijani political honeymoon, Baku attempts to find balance between Ankara and Moscow, keeping also in mind oil interests of the UK and USA. Georgia positions itself as a supporter of American values, generally conducting anti-Russian policies.

In the last twenty years the ongoing geopolitical and geostrategic transformations in the Caucasus has been fundamentally changing the political image of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan as new subjects of international law, and the relevant foreign policy practices. Two critical circumstances prevent them from becoming full-fledged members of the international community and participating in the process of new world order formation. These are: (a) East-West struggle; and (b) ethnic and interstate conflicts. Generally, the Caucasus along with the Balkans are considered sources of threat to the international security. In the Caucasus as a whole, “there are over 50 smoldering ethno-political conflicts, many of which are international... ethnic differences can be used by certain political forces (including international ones) and political leaders, when purely political nature is attributed to them” [5, c. 222]. In addition to overt conflicts between Georgians, Abkhazians, Ossetians, Armenians and Azeri, there are covert animosities between ethnic majorities of the South Caucasus states and minority Armenians of Javakhk (Georgia), Talyshis and Lezgians (Azerbaijan). The no war, no peace situation in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, absence of diplomatic relations and unresolved issues between Armenia and Turkey, as well as geopolitical ambitions of Ankara maintain a cold war status and push them away from the framework of world politics.

One of the effects produced by the collapse of the Soviet Union was emergence of polities in the Caucasus that declared sovereignty and were even able to uphold it during the conflicts. However, they were not recognized internationally, but just by a few members of the UN. These are Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh Republic and Transnistria Moldavian Republic. Also, in 1990s there were several failed attempts to gain and institutionalize independence through military actions. The most vivid example of this was Chechen Republic of Ichkeria [6]. Some other authors believe Russia disregarded these developments as something like an unfinished reality. “They did not become fully independent... the Russians called neighboring states “near-abroad” and treated them as prodigal sons, rather than independent nations” [7, c. 363].

Implementation of the program of Centre for European Policy Studies, in our opinion, may help ease the political tensions in the region, contribute to the process of establishing normal relations between the states and joining the family of civilized nations. Below are some of its components:

1. Solving the issue of the right to self-determination (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh) based on peculiarities of each case and expression of free will by populations of each ethno-territorial polity. Congresses representing each polity are to be established that will have an authority to adopt laws and would protect political, cultural, and religious rights of the polity.
2. Bilateral and multilateral regional cooperation, particularly in the frameworks of the EU and CIS. The three independent nations of the South Caucasus (plus Nakhichevan territory) should be able to participate in this cooperation as separate entities. However, it is too early to conceive

of establishing such relations in the form of regional structures. South Caucasus, as a strategic area, cannot remain isolated from global processes, and hence, the states of the region, as well as regional organizations are under the imperative to establish balanced cooperation. The cooperation has to be at the levels of both political institutions and civic non-government organizations.

3. The historical experience tells that ethnic problems hinder regional cooperation. This is a serious challenge that peoples of South Caucasus need to overcome, if they strive to build alternative societies, because societies based on these values are more capable of regulating ethnic discord between the peoples.
4. Finally, the system of regional security should be able to respond to the needs of the South Caucasus peoples, with consideration of the historical experience of conflicts and geopolitical counteractions between the larger powers. The geopolitical competition between Russia and the Western superpowers, Russia and Turkey, and the Armenian-Turkish conflict are the striking realities of this historical experience. The main elements of the South Caucasus security system must be capable of countering such clashes and ensuring the peoples' security. Yet the complexity of the existing problems prevents creation of a common security system. Each state in South Caucasus takes care of its own security and in the foreseeable future it is hard to change this situation. Nonetheless, the only means to protect the population of the region from devastating clashes is to maintain the common neutrality of the states [8].

September, 2015

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ON THE DEVELOPMENTS OF YOUTH MOVEMENTS IN ARMENIA

*Samvel Manukyan**

The “No to Robbery!” Public Movement

In May 2015 the public movement “No to Robbery!” emerged in Yerevan in relation to the electricity tariff rate hikes [1]. The movement demanded to annul the resolution by Public Services Regulatory Commission on increasing electricity tariffs in Armenia. Leaders and participants of the movement declared that their demands are purely economic and not political. As evidence to that, the members of movement who had blocked Baghramian Avenue in Yerevan since June 22, 2015, would expel various provocateurs of unknown origin and adventurers who make living by politics. The movement sustained high vigor and had a good development potential. Under a number of conditions it could have seriously shatter the domestic political stability of Armenia and lead to extremely undesirable effects.

Armenian authorities and especially the president clearly realized that there is a deep gap between the government and society and hence, they correctly assessed the chances of undesirable development of the movement that could turn unmanageable with internal resources, as well as the risks of the movement being used by external forces for their purpose.

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Therefore, the president suspended the resolution electricity tariff increase and ordered an international audit to investigate how justified is the price increase and to assess the effects of not increasing the tariffs. Most importantly, he announced that the audit will be conducted in as transparent manner as possible and consistent to this approach offered the movement members to form a group of representative that will take part in the audit.

And here it became clear that the *youth movement is immature in terms of adequate communication with the government and consciousness about the overall context of their demands.*

The youth movement rejected the offer to participate in the audit. One reason was that they assumed the authorities might fool them, if they participate in the audit. That is, among thousands of young people there was nobody who had enough knowledge to participate in the audit. The movement refused to accept responsibility of serious communication with the government and continued insisting on the demand that has become infantile after the offer of cooperation: annul the resolution and period. Second reason was that they did not think or were unable to bring in knowledgeable people, who supported the demands of the movement (actually, the whole country supported the demand except, perhaps, a specific small group of people who can make money on tariff hikes), did not depend on the government and were ready to take part in the audit as representatives of the public.

The movement split in two, as one part continued blocking the Baghramian Avenue and the other one moved to the Freedom Square of Yerevan.

After one week the police broke the blockade of the avenue. A few activists of the movement threatened to block other street of the city and a represen-

tative of a political party known for its tradition of hunger strikes and lie-down strikes started a lie-down hunger strike.

Two questions are relevant her:

1. *Was such development of the movement unpredictable?*
2. *What other developments are possible in the strategic perspective?*

The Formedness of Civic Worldview among the Youth

It is known that we live in a capitalist social system. Moreover, the only existing world-system¹ is currently also capitalistic, while capitalism itself remains imperialistic and monopolistic. On the other hand, over the last 100 years among the industrial, commercial and financial capitals the financial one enjoys absolute dominance.

Currently, the phrase “market economy” is used instead of the term capitalism. Where from and how it has appeared? According to John Kenneth Galbraith, one of the most prominent American economists, after the global economic crisis of 1929-1933, the USA was worried about unprecedented economic successes in the USSR and the resulting propagation of socialist and communist ideas, so a there was a need to develop and implement new approaches to the ideological struggle. In this context the most reputable American economists and political scientists began to work and as Galbraith claims, invented the term “market economy”, which then gradually replaced the term capitalism².

It is well known that in economic crises the monopolies, especially natural monopolies, use their high structural and hence, dominant positions in eco-

¹ *World-system* in I. Wallerstein’s definition. In the historical periods of the past there were several world-systems existing *simultaneously*.

² The term “market economy” was also used by F. Braudel to describe the market where craftsmen and farmers sell the *results of their work*, where there are no oligopolies and monopolies. Braudel views “market economy” as the lowest niche of the capitalist system [3].

conomic the system, as well as their sufficient financial resources to “convince” the governments, especially weak ones that depend on international capital, to “protect” the backbone infrastructures, including the banking system, energy system, etc. That is why even in “receding” economies where numerous bankruptcies take place, the monopolistic, usually transnational corporations not only preserve their capitals, but multiply them. Under the legal concept of “commercial secret” they have the best possibilities to hide financial manipulations not only from the wide public, but also from those government or non-government structures that could in any way prevent those.

Under particular conditions of a given economic crisis some particular monopolies have unique justifications to openly increase the tariffs and prices for the good and services they offer. However, large transnational corporation usually suffer the least from economic crises. They are capable of achieving the “sacred” goal of a capitalist (private) enterprise, the profit making, under any economic conditions of the moment. If the transnational monopolies would be unable to achieve this goal, it would mean an end to capitalism.

Are the people, especially intellectuals and particularly the college students, who are by default are either actual or would-be intellectuals, aware of these truths known since long ago? To understand this, let us review several accessible survey data.

In a survey¹ conducted among the university students of Yerevan in 2015, only 7.0% of students answered correctly the question “In your opinion, currently what is the social system in Armenia?” Some 7.2% gave an incorrect answer, 21.6% gave instead an answer about the political regime or the political

¹ Մանուկյան Ս., ՀՀ ուսանողների կենսատճի և Բոլոնիայի գործընթացի գնահատման հետազոտություն: IPSC Քաղաքական և սոցիոլոգիական խորհրդատվությունների ինստիտուտ, 2015թ.:

system. Interestingly, *57.3% of the respondents said they did not know*, while 6.9% provided absurd answers. Students studying social sciences were relatively more aware about the social system, but even among them the correct answers comprised only 12.4%. This means:

- *Out of 8 social science students (economists, lawyers, sociologists, political science students) 7 are not aware what is the current social system in Armenia.*

This fact directly points that *in the universities the level of knowledge in social sciences is very low regardless of their area of studies, whether social science, humanities, natural sciences or technical disciplines.*

Although during the study years the social science knowledge of students increase, but *even in the 2nd years Master's degree studies only 9.2% of the students answered correctly what is the current social system in Armenia.*

If 93% of the students in Yerevan do not either know or know “approximately” or know incorrectly the name of the social system where they live, then it can be assumed that the percentage of students who have specific knowledge about social science theories, including adequate social theories is very close to 0%. It would be also unjustified to suppose that the students possess systematic social science knowledge. Nonetheless, exceptions are possible. Obviously, if the students do not even know what social system they live in, then it is hard to assume they are aware of any cohesive concept about it.

- *Hence, the ideological dead end for the “No to Robbery!” youth public movement was logical.*
- *Having no skills and knowledge necessary for constructive communication, the students faced either the path of confrontation, or “disgraceful” retreat, with the latter being “unacceptable” for the ambitious youth.*

What developments are possible in youth movements?

Since the students of Yerevan have no systematic social worldview, they are subject to manipulations. And manipulations are possible and efficient when they are based on mental anchors that exist in social consciousness.

What are the mental anchors in the consciousness of the Yerevan students that can be used by internal and external forces to “curb” these movements? Let us review the mental anchors in the social consciousness related to two fundamental problems, as they were explored by the same survey:

1. What is the main reason for inequality in the society?
2. What are the viewpoints of the students regarding the phenomenon, when elites stand above the law and social norm?

To uncover the anchors related to the first issue, the students were asked the following question: “*Which of the following statements is the closest to your opinion regarding the inequality and poverty?*” The answer choices and percentages of respective responses turned as follows:

- “Every person is responsible for his/her well-being” – 58.8% of the students.
- “If the country prospers economically, these issues would be solved” – 12.1% of the respondents.
- “The main reason for poverty and inequality is the injustice in the country” – 27.7%.

The remaining 1.4% either did not agree with any of the statements or found it hard to answer.

The standpoints of students on equality before the law were found out through the following question: “*In your opinion, is it natural that the rich and the powers that be break the law and get away with it, because whoever gets*

rich or acquires power would behave like that?» Two-thirds of the students, 66.6% answered “No” and one-third, or 33.0% answered “yes”, while 0.4% found it hard to answer.

What can be concluded based on these findings, is that individualistic, *liberal* viewpoints dominate in the consciousness of approximately 60% of the students, while about 25% adhere to *systemic criticism* standpoint. For two-thirds of the youth the *social behaviors of the elite are unacceptable*, when they stand above the law, while the one-third would probably behave in the same manner if there was a chance to do so¹.

Even such a superficial analysis of data allows suggesting that.

- *Other things held equal, the youth movement can be more easily manipulated using strategies that apply liberal-democratic content, rather than some other ideologies.*
- *However, every fourth student does have a feeling that the social system is flawed².*

On the other hand, the color revolutions during the past decade and especially the Ukrainian “maidan” that started in 2013 suggest that in such cases it is always necessary to view civil movements first of all from the perspective of the chances to turn into destructive social processes, and then also political ones.

The complexes of social consciousness among the student youth

Given that student youth has no elementary social science knowledge, that does not necessarily mean they have no social *proto*-complexes.

What are these complexes among the social stratum of students and youth,

¹Obviously, this does not necessarily mean such behavior would not be manifested also by some of those who responded that breaking the law by elites is unacceptable.

²The circumstance described earlier show that it is just a feeling, not a knowledge.

and what possible developments could those lead to? Within the framework of the above mentioned survey these complexes were studied, too.

The results of survey indicate that currently in consciousness of student youth there are two main mental complexes, which may significantly influence the development of student movement.

The first complex is: *lack of trust toward the current political system, and as a part of it also pessimism about Armenia's future*. The specific content of this complex is that the student youth think the conditions in Armenia will not improve in the coming years, and do not believe that the rulers of Armenia sincerely want to improve the situation in the country. On the other hand, they think the political forces are no better and they pursue interests of their leaders, not ordinary people. Finally, the Armenian state also does not protect the interests of ordinary people.

The content of the second complex is that the student youth believe *serious changes* are necessary for Armenia, and *new political figures* are needed for that. At the same time they think the *non-government organizations* contribute to improvement of life in Armenia.

Currently these two complexes in the public consciousness of the students are weakly interconnected.

There are also three other factors in the public consciousness of the students that although are not interconnected with the two described above, but if properly used, can prompt various development scenarios for student movements. These are: (a) two-thirds of the students believe Armenia needs to be ruled with a strong hand, while one-third think Armenia needs democracy; (b) two-thirds of the students think the economic elite of Armenia plays negative

role in development of the country, while one-third think the role is positive; (c) opinions are divided equally on what is preferable for Armenia: capitalism or socialism, while about 10% had no opinion on this issue¹.

The results of the study are consistent with the structure of “No to Robbery!” movement’s evolvement. The movement rejected the “old” opposition parties and politicians. An exception was made for just one political figure that had demonstratively left all already “traditional” parties and established a new political party. However, this “new” political figure has not been given (yet) any serious role within the movement².

On the other hand, it is remarkable that the opposition parties in their turn did not really make any vigorous efforts to take part in the movement. This may mean with their experience they assessed and understood, or perhaps they have been clued that they will not be able to become political leaders of this movement, while too active and ineffective *involvement* with the students would have further shattered their already low reputation³.

However, the data of the study and the structure, nature and content of the Armenian civil society (in a narrow sense) suggest that:

- *Currently, there is a large potential for emergence of new political figures and entities in Armenia.*
- *Political developments in Armenia will largely depend on who, how and in what ideological framework this potential will be implemented.*

¹ It may seem strange how the students can compare socialism and capitalism, if they do not know what is the social system in Armenia. As a reminder, no answer options were offered for the question regarding the social system. Whereas the comparison of socialism and capitalism was made by answering the following question: “Do you agree that the capitalist system is preferable over the socialist one?” Thus, in this case the knowledge of students was not assessed, but rather their standpoints based on fragmentary knowledge were compared.

² This obviously, does not mean it is impossible in future.

³ Nevertheless, one may not totally discard the possibility of “old” parties becoming close to the movement.

- *New political figures and unions will form or grow (whether spontaneously or through guidance) from members of NGOs or people surrounding them*

Apparently, this implies complicated, multifaceted and diverging processes that will occur (most likely already ongoing) in Armenia in realizing this potential.

Obviously, the need for a national ideology acceptable for the youth has already shaped in Armenia. The one who will solve this problem faster and more effectively will take over the future of Armenia.

It has to be noted that there is an urgent need for not only presenting such ideology to the public, but also implementing specific and effective strategies to achieve acceptance of the new ideology in the society. Half-hearted and uncertain ideology-imitations and controversial actions not only would turn ineffective, but will hinder achievement of objectives of the circles, *including the government*, which would present those to the public and first of all to the youth, especially the students.

In such case the arena will become wide open for those who are indifferent to the future and security of Armenia and Armenian people, and are just trying solve their global and regional issues. The fertile ground for manipulations by such forces is ready.

It is time to make decisions and act upon them.

July, 2015

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INTERNATIONALIZATION AS INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN ARMENIA

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The 21st century may very well become known as the century of the “global world” (McFarland, Senen and Childress 1993) in the chronological continuum to the late-20th century that was preeminently the century of the “democratic triumph” (Diamond 2008). The surge and process of globalization, the “spirit of the time” for democracy (Diamond 2008), the growing importance of pronounced ideologies and the pursuit to construct, safeguard and sustain democracy, and a sense of identity underlie much of what is currently happening in the world nowadays. Furthermore, a changed interplay of the relations between the state and society requires an extensive streamlining in the education practices in the 21st century.

The 20th century witnessed arduous efforts of world polities to withstand the ups and downs in their education systems. The 21st century has transformed into an age predominantly knowledge-based economy, where human capital plays an increasingly important role in the social outcomes. Accordingly, education is regarded a basic foundation that supports the long-term development and progress of any society. The well-organized and competitive education system is

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the key to economic growth and social cohesion. This is also predicated on the reality that education is socially desirable. The EU and OECD countries consider investment in education as substantial input in the growth of society and social development, as well as embedding life-long learning at all education levels. Moreover, an educated workforce is also economically desirable because an educated worker is able to perform more complex tasks aligned with the labor market needs. Governments of developing countries are “therefore under pressure to increase spending on education to produce a more educated labor force” (Carnoy 1999: 16). Thus, contribution of the state towards the improvement of overall educational outputs may bring an added value and benefit both to the society and knowledge-based economy.

Nevertheless, rapid changes and profound transformations in the field of education have created not only opportunities for both advanced and emerging economies at all levels, but also challenges, namely, the the need to overcome the obstacles of the existing infrastructures and to eliminate factors negatively affecting the quality of education. This is further complicated by the presence of conflicting interests and contesting values between global, regional and local educational environments, and the necessity to engage and retain human capital. Furthermore, universities are to address many challenges of functioning in the rapidly changing world: challenges of growing markets and globalization, changes in labor markets and consequent emerging demands for competitive workforce, advancement of new information and communication technologies, massification of education, especially the increasing demand for higher education, cross-national and international measurements of education quality, new performance metrics on efficiency, accountability and transparency, global

higher education ranking systems, competition challenges and consolidation-related issues in the field of education, knowledge management, cross-border educational activities, etc. These challenges can rarely be addressed individually.

Contextual Situation in Armenia

The issue is more complex and typical for societies in transition. The education in Armenia has not been excepted from impacts of these global tendencies and developments. In the period from regaining independence in 1991 to joining the Bologna Process in 2005, Armenia ideologically distanced itself from global educational reforms and did not make commitments to the indoctrination of educational reforms. This conceptually relates to an assertion that “educational reform may be seen as a ‘placebo,’ that is, “symbolic gestures designed to indicate governmental [etc.] awareness of the problems and sympathetic intentions, rather than serious efforts to achieve social change” (Campbell 1982: 328). However, after that Armenia has systematically attributed great importance to the formation of a functional education system, has formulated and implemented the strategy of revitalizing the country through science and education and has treated the development of education as a strategic priority in this drive. As education is input of government, state authorities should be mainly concerned with developing and implementing an educational policy that is geared towards competitive practices of higher education institutions (HEIs), because the main output is produced by them. The level of interdependence between policy fields is on rise in Armenia. Hence, internationalization in the Armenian higher education institutions is to some extent aspired and desired. Armenia certainly pushes forward the processes of reforms and steady development of education.

However, the country currently faces challenges of reforming its education system to respond to the constantly changing global demands and educational reforms of the developed societies and countries with well-established national systems and infrastructures. Additionally, there are major challenges in relation to social, political, and economic cultural transformations. These challenges include, but are not limited to dramatic demographic changes (increasing migration flows, especially “brain drain” among the youth, inflows of heterogeneous residents and age structures); growing global competition, leading to a considerable shift in the distribution of the economic power at regional level; changes in science and technology but notably the growing importance of organizational and societal innovation, rather than purely technological innovation and challenges common of societies in transition (social cohesion, protection of human rights, etc.), imbalanced development between general and higher education systems, insufficient state investment, and governance malpractices in the Armenian higher education system.

As a reaction to all these challenges, the reforms undertaken are definitely catalysts for internationalization and they cause fundamental changes in the emergent paradigm of education. Internationalization is a “core issue of concern to the higher education enterprise, touching directly on questions of social and cultural relevance, institutional quality and prestige, national competitiveness, and innovation potential.... institutions also view internationalization as a source of potential revenue” (Rumbley, Altbach and Reisberg 2012: 3).

Whilst Armenia, as a democratic society, is still designing its own education system based on national vision and strategies, the advanced practices and exemplary policies found in the leading education systems should be tapped

into. In order to obtain competitive advantage, the Armenian higher education system should further advance an open environment and break down traditional barriers between academic disciplines in order to enhance appropriate arrangements to encourage knowledge-competitive practices and integrate distinctive aspects of different subject areas into the process of reinvigorating educational policy.

So far Armenia has not reinvigorated heterogeneous dimensions of its societal priorities in the democratic role of higher education. Though Armenia does have limited natural resources, intellectual potential in Armenia is an important factor in the reform agenda of its education system and should not be ignored in the reform processes. The intellectual wealth of knowledge and best practices of the field must serve as a basis for the development of interrelated values that constitute the prime components of the social construct underpinning all government activity. This social construct facilitates the operation of the important mechanism of collaborative partnership that must exist between education providers and education recipients to achieve effective governance, between education and industry to generate better conditions for the practical implementation of research results and to make a tangible impact on society. Hence, education and conveying knowledge from one generation to another is the first to be inevitably taken into consideration as a stable guarantee for meeting the needs of global development in the information and knowledge era.

This objective is further complicated because the national context of Armenia has also undergone significant changes from social perspective. The diversification of population and increasing trends in the heterogeneity of population, especially the inflow of young Armenians from Diaspora, have necessitated

opening the field in the traditional view of civic participation to the modern overview, to reflect the growing diversity of reforms and emerging institutions. With the paradigm shift and decentralization the very responsibility to strengthen and implement relevant structures was devolved to HEIs.

It is imperative to step beyond the interim problems of imbalanced development, insufficient state investment and governance malpractices in the Armenian higher education system and visualize a bigger picture of cause and effect relationships in incorporating a strategic approach of obtaining further knowledge and promoting internationally comparable indicators to examine effective educational reforms. Education reforms in Armenia are conceptually about changing values, dispositions, attitudes, behaviors, and principles. Thus, developing on the basis of the structural reforms in the education system and meeting the challenges of current economic trends, Armenia has adopted the policy of integrating to the outside world.

Current trends of modern education reforms in Armenia are designed to replicate the basic situation of international developments in the field of education. These reforms ensue in two trajectories: educational democratization and economic competition. Educational democratization involves such processes as establishing the democratic education system and raising the quality of education, altering the educational structure into three-layer construct of higher education, and introducing the concept of life-long learning into the general policy of current educational reforms. Economic competition involves the globalization and integration of economic practices, introduction of innovative and information technologies into the field of education, meeting the needs of education and labor markets, and close integration of science into enterprises.

The reformers in Armenia should therefore diverge from the flow of international developments and amply frame the discourse of education based on nationally established practices of academia and its peculiarities in order to accelerate the establishment of a flexible learning system. Certain innovative solutions and strategies should be generated and incorporated into institutional reforms, and a multifaceted perspective of competences should be developed to interact in synergy towards the objective of rigorous research and teaching in higher education.

Armenia implements an array of policy reforms at various levels of governance. These reforms ensue in two equally important processes: a top-down process and a bottom-up process. A top-down process proceeds from the RoA government and the RoA Ministry of Education and Science that are concerned of their responsibilities in the field of education. A bottom-up process mainly proceeds from state higher education institutions that bring their own strong commitment to real contribution of sustainable advancement of education in Armenia. However, there is an drastic disparity between these two processes. Higher education institutions as stakeholders are not actively engaged in the development of educational policies in order to embody the interests of those groups of population that they serve. HEIs target only at the micro level and benefit their constituents with impact mainly within their specific context, while acting in congruence with the national bodies might contribute to educational reforms and thus have a meaningful impact at the macro level to achieve the overall objectives of the higher education policy. Thus, there is an ongoing preponderance of short-term and long-term activities geared towards producing competitive education system in Armenia.

It is crucial to acknowledge that HEIs are key players in the successful transition to a knowledge-based economy and they harmonize the incongruities between continuous reforms in the Armenian education system and knowledge creation. Specifically, challenges of education reforms in Armenia are characterized by existing top-down centralized management, poor governance and institutional bureaucracies that incapacitate the European or world values in the higher education. HEIs also play an important role in the reform agenda of overall education system and significantly contribute not only to organizational and educational innovation, but also purely to technological innovation and overall competitiveness of the education system. Furthermore, HEIs provide formal education for a new generation of leaders who are agents of change that multiply and extrapolate the effect at society level. This new generation might further provide the pools of expertise and supply human resources for establishing centers of excellence. HEIs also acknowledge that internationalization fosters internal competition; both between the HEIs at the national level and “within the walls” of any given HEI. Others want to be “on par” with those with international dimension.

These challenges of education reforms might be typical for emerging democracies in the period of economic and social transition to adapt the best practices and mechanisms of governance from mature democracies and economies. So far, this discussion has never been driven by theoretical propositions, and no attempt was made to create an integrated corpus of empirical data on the impacts of internationalization in Armenia. Accordingly, this theoretical exploration might set up the ground for developing a conceptual framework on the objectives of sustaining an efficient and competitive system of higher education in Armenia.

In addition, there is limited amount of literature on the role and impact of internationalization at global level. The literature on the development of higher education in Armenia is relatively scarce, too. The examination of the literature on higher education reforms and current national and institutional internationalization efforts shows the lack of studies on the internationalization process in Armenia. This gap calls for exploration of the challenges, opportunities and strategies of the higher education internationalization in Armenia. This article further views the overall conceptual framework of internationalization as the process of integrating international or global dimensions into strategic priorities, functions or delivery of higher education at both national and institutional levels.

Framework of Internationalization of Higher Education

The process of internationalization is multidimensional and there is no common understanding of the term. Within the framework of higher education, the international dimension of the curriculum has undergone through progress in terms of transition from area studies and foreign language approach to the integration of international, global, and comparative perspectives into academic program content and related processes (Knight 2004: 27). According to Knight (2008) and de Wit (2002), there is no covenant on a precise or universal definition of internationalization. Some authors describe internationalization as synonymous with the term globalization and use it interchangeably, assuming the internationalization process as globalization of education. Others, however, perceive it as a process inevitably impacted by aspects of globalization, but make clear differentiations between the two phenomena (Enders, 2004; Klieber, 2007; Knight & de Wit, 1997; Knight, 2008). According to these authors globalization

refers to increased interdependence, convergence of markets, cultures, ideas, and knowledge across borders. Internationalization, on other hand, is a process that encourages relationships and mutual collaboration between states.

Generally, the literature on internationalization can be divided in two tracks. The first includes the US-based approaches (Hudzik, 2011; Green & Olson, 2006) focused on institutional internationalization and considers institutions as a major force leading to internationalization. The second is predominantly European (Knight, 2004, 2008; de Wit, 2002; Enders, 2004; van de Wende, 1997, 2001, 2004), which explores national and supranational levels of internationalization.

Van der Wende (1997: 18) presents a broad definition of internationalization as a “systematic effort aimed at making higher education responsive to the requirements and challenges related to the globalization of societies, economy and labor markets.” This definition includes specific rationales and important elements of internationalization. The Bologna process is an example of organized intergovernmental responses to internationalization. The 1999 Bologna Declaration set the long-term goal of convergence of different European higher education systems into the European Higher Education Area. The Declaration became the primary framework used by signatory countries for modernization and reforms of the European higher education.

In some cases, internationalization is approached as an activity such as increasing student and faculty mobility and building international partnerships at institutional and national levels (Knight, 2008). In other cases, internationalization is about integrating international content or perspective in each of the academic disciplines (Kreber, 2009). According to Stier (2004), different under-

standings of the term lead to its divergent conceptualizations: “some people see it as process, some as a state of things and some as a doctrine” (Stier, 2004, p. 84). She argues that actors have divergent motives for internationalization and these motives lead to different ideologies.

Knight (2008) presents a conceptual framework for internationalization strategies at institutional and national levels. The strategies at the institutional level are divided into academic and organizational. Academic strategies focus on academic programs, research, scholarly collaboration, external relations and extra-curricular activities. Organizational strategies involve governance, operations, services and human resources. Policies include any national or institutional level strategies related to the international dimension in higher education such as cultural, scientific, immigration, employment and others (Knight, 2008).

Both Knight and de Wit approach internationalization as a process and explore how different factors and rationales shape and influence this process. Knight (2008) emphasizes the national level in her most recent definition. Knight (2008) suggests this definition as a concept that can be applied to many different countries, cultures and education systems. Furthermore, Hudzik (2011: 8) writes: the “ultimate purpose behind internationalization is better connection of institutions to a changing local and global environment and providing more relevant service to society and clientele under these changing realities.”

A shortcoming of much of the literature on internationalization in higher education is that specific contexts to which the concepts and frameworks are assumed to be applicable have not been specified. These Western perspectives that predominately focus on institutional internationalization in de-centralized systems have not considered the role of this process in transitional countries

with developing higher education systems. However, Qiang's (2003: 250) definition of internationalization as "important resource in the development of higher education towards, first of all a system in line with international standards; secondly, one open and responsive to its global environment" is of relevance to understanding the process in Armenia. The growing knowledge-based economy in Armenia requires a rapid development and internationalization of higher education that will be responsive to the demands of the local and global labor markets.

Thus, Qiang's (2003) and Knight's (2008) definitions of internationalization, along with Stier's (2004) concepts of internationalization provide the conceptual framework for further analyzing this process in the Armenian higher education system. The role of the government and national policies in the process of higher education internationalization adds additional context to these frameworks.

Conclusion

Overall, the earnest pursuit of education gains the capacity to visualize a broader spectrum of perspectives. The educational reforms in Armenia should be transformed into a more competitive reality, especially in times of the growing scarcity of the professional workforce. This is further convoluted by the fact that education is an integral component of the knowledge-based economy of Armenia, contributing relatively large portions of the gross domestic production and employment. And, consequently, higher education system is forced to improve itself in the directions of both efficiency and competitiveness.

Ever-increasing shifts in the education realm have created unique contemporary problems that are global in impact and, therefore, pose challenges previ-

ously unprecedented in complexity. On the whole, globalization is a driving force in the development of higher education reforms, rather than a process within itself. Understanding the impact of globalization and internationalization as well as the context of their emergent trends might influence the design of strategies and models that are applicable to Armenia with its transitioning higher education system. Furthermore, they should be strategically comprehended in initiating a strategic approach to implementing current reforms in the education paradigm.

Thus, the process of internationalization in the higher education context in Armenia has designed several new constructs that in the long will run create competitive advantage for Armenia. These constructs include new balance in government-university relationship, institutional and academic autonomy, expansion of access to higher education, new external pressures of accountability, increased number of universities hospitable to internationally minded-scholars, and support to academic staff in the changing context of higher institutions. The components of international education include mobility of students and teaching staff, study abroad and exchange initiatives, foreign student population in Armenia, among others. These inputs produce the quality of combined outputs such as the quality and credibility of scholarly judgment and increasing number of publications in international peer-reviewed journals, increasing faculty involvement in overseas activities.

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SOME STRUCTURAL PECULIARITIES OF THE HIERARCHICAL INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

*Vahagn Aglyan**

The thesis of anarchy remains demanded both in terms of the leading postulates in international relations (IR) theories and as a “guiding” approach in foreign policy implementation process. Its main principle for the real politics is that anarchy reigns in the international system. This does not necessarily imply an absolute or relative chaos in the system of international affairs, but rather, is based on a postulate of absence of any structured institution that would ensure international order. The discourse on establishment of global governance mechanisms and instruments, despite its “sustained urgency”, has not produced any even conceptually practical means to face the challenges or solve the problems stemming from the nature of international anarchy. The classical international political discourse continues to be dominated by the traditional argument that “none is entitled to command; none is required to obey” [1]. Within the same tradition, R. Art and R. Jervis assert that “anarchy is the fundamental fact of international relations.” [2]

Nevertheless, retrospection of even the not so far past shows that in practice, interstate/international models and modes for hierarchic regulation not only did exist, but also endure currently and are extremely important in understanding the international and regional dynamics. In the post-Cold War context,

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where previously dominant disciplined order has steadily being been replaced by the regional systems, the examination of macro-regional hierarchic choices and analysis of their underlying operational properties is acquiring a particular importance.

*Some Peculiar Manifestations of International Hierarchy
during the Cold War Era*

After the World War II, during the Cold War era, maintaining order at the systemic level of international relations was principally based on the so-called bipolar stringency, whereby the two dominating powers in the system, the USA and the USSR, assumed the role of ensuring worldwide stability or at least controllability of developments unfolding across the various parts of the world. One of the characteristic aspects of international relations during those time was the rejection of the legitimacy of the bipolar paradigm created by under direct supervision of the two superpowers: both Moscow and Washington did not officially recognize each other's extensive claims¹. Unlike the preceding colonial period, when the rules of the game were based on an "established consensus" between the main actors and that was considered ideologically acceptable for the key actors, the Cold War inertial thinking did not really inspire much hope about the prospects of "peaceful coexistence". The US-Soviet global rivalry, though did not cross the boundaries of rationality, yet was based on the notion of dismantlement of each other's domestic political and regional clout just to spread its own influence and control instead.

At the same time, with all inherent controversies and threats, the bipolar world order unleashed some essential transformations in the concept of interna-

¹ R. Cooper, *The Post Modern State and the World Order*, Demos 2000, pp. 12-13.
<http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/thepostmodernstate.pdf>

tional relations, and influenced the positions and relationship of the forces of international system, their hierarchic structure, as well as the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the system [3, с. 185-186]. It has to be noted that the classical realist approaches that dominated international relations for decades and were tied to the ideas of priority of national interests and security dilemma, were perceived as components of a “problem-solving” thesis.

Nevertheless, in the Cold War era both the US and Soviet foreign policies were characterized by a tenor of principal opposition to the colonial approach. The former geopolitical perceptions of the British Empire were deemed unacceptable in normative and political, as well as operational terms [4]. The direct action format as a method of implementing foreign policy¹ was removed from the agenda, given the dynamics of global transformations and the peculiarities of the standoff between the two superpowers. Unlike the immediate and direct action strategy of the colonial times typical for, say, British and French policies in Africa and Asia², the rules external engagement and interference in the modern times underwent significant transformations. Recognition of sovereignty and universal equality as a formalized norm of modern interstate relations significantly changed the rules of control and perceptions on (macro)regional developments and processes [5].

Another key characteristic of the modern times has been that the discipline among the groupings of countries formed around the power centers was ensued by these centers, through applying both institutionalized and ad hoc control mechanisms. Unlike the classical era of imperialism, when the main

¹ А. Журавлев, Параметры эффективности внешней политики в зарубежной литературе, *Международные процессы: журнал теории международных отношений и мировой политики*, <http://www.intertrends.ru/twelfth/006.htm>

² Ibid.

driver for territorial expansion and political consolidation was the inflow of resources from colonies to metropolises or as D. Lake has defined it, competition between the great powers [6], in the modern times the two great powers were the ones to spend enormous resources to maintain their “own” zones of influence. Worded differently, significant funding was directed to ensure social and political stability in the zones of influence and satellite territories, as well as allied nations. Evidently, the funds and resources spent on ensuring internal stability, sustainability (political, social and economic) and external security of the countries in the zones of influence, were an indicator of a wider, geopolitical function. This was about manageability and controllability of regional developments and dynamics, which understandably, required substantial costs.

For instance, after the World War II, the USSR had to incur huge costs to keep the Eastern and Central Europe under its integrated and manageable control. By one estimate, while initially the USSR withdrew nearly \$1 billion in resources and capital per year from Central and Eastern Europe, by 1980s the Soviet Union was subsidizing economies of Eastern Europe to a total of about \$17 billion per year. Annual subsidies were offered to the Comecon countries to maintain the unity and interrelation among the Soviet bloc [7].

In essence, since the Cold War period some modern concepts were formed for international relations that in some sense contradicted the classical, anarchic notions. These new concepts, perhaps, were hard to unequivocally qualify simply as imperialistic or hegemonic. This is the phenomenon of hierarchic international relations, which despite having historical precedence (such as the macro-regional paradigm established by ancient China [8]), in modern times acquired a new conception in terms of its status and operation.

Hierarchy and the System of International Relations: Modern Perceptions

The analytic and applied significance of international hierarchy is based on several aspects.

At the *theoretical level* the phenomenon of hierarchy in the international relations may open important prospects for analysis and conceptualization from several viewpoints. First, in both academic and political discourse, which apparently is under the influence of (neo)realistic “problem-solving” dialectic [9], the processes occurring in international relations are mostly viewed as a result of interactions between systemic factors. There are numerous and diverse theoretical and conceptual approaches that accept the thesis of anarchy as a guiding principle in international relations, and consider among the drivers of international relations mostly such “faceless” structural phenomena as configuration of forces, general systemic features of their arrangement, the security dilemma, etc. In this context, reviewing the dynamics of international relations from the perspective of the hierarchical thesis may bring to the forefront not only and not so much an alternative point of view, but rather would considerably widen the research base. In addition to material resource and materialistic perceptions on international relations (which by themselves are the basic preconditions of international hierarchy), it can introduce the variables of authority, legitimacy and identity into the theoretical domain. The concept of international hierarchy is close to the constructivist paradigm [10] and may also create an important bridge to the theory of foreign policy.

At the *policy analysis level*, review and examination of international processes and phenomena in the hierarchic context can be important in several aspects. First of all, the underlying logic of hierarchic modus tends to use and rely

more on quantitative methods, which advantageously differs from the traditional qualitative method of foreign policy analysis. The phenomena under examination in the hierarchical system are relatively more objective. At the same time, the analysis of international developments in the context of hierarchy draws relatively clear boundaries between the relevant time phases.

In international (inter-state) relations, hierarchy is defined as a system of social stratification [11]. On one hand, it can be viewed as a static means to describe a *certain status* and a “format” in the international relations, given the differences in the status of the main actors/countries of the international system in relation to each other (legally, all nations are equal, but “some are more equal than others” [12]). On the other hand, it may also be operational in nature, thus reflecting and involving the dynamics, variables and area indicators of hierarchic relations (transformations).

R. Aron argues that three structural measures are typical for international systems: power configuration, existence of hierarchy between the main actors, and the homogeneous or heterogeneous nature of the international system participants [3, c. 185]. The author contends that hierarchy reflects the actual inequality of the actors in terms military, technological, economic, political, resource, ideological and other means of affecting the international system [3, c. 185].

As it has been already mentioned above, almost all the international relations theories and schools are based on the unbothered hypothesis of anarchy dominating the international arena, with exception, probably, of the constructivist stream believing that neither anarchy, nor hierarchy are *a priori* predetermined phenomena, but rather just potentially possible outcomes of practical interactions between the actors themselves. As for the proponents of the concept

of hierarchy in the international arena, they adhere to various theoretical and doctrinal schools, such as the power transition theory or the English school of “international society/community” paradigm. Generally, two types of international hierarchy are distinguished: systems based on the principle of “coercion” and that of “voluntarism”.¹ The first one is characterized by use of a coercing force (including direct force) to ensure preservation of the pyramid-type regimes, whereas the second one, by voluntary acceptance of the rule of a dominant power. Usually, in discursive and semantic terms the modern perception of hierarchic systems does not imply direct imperial control or direct (external) governance. Rather, a proxy or “contracted” ruling power is implied, that is accepted as such both by the dominant and subordinate states [13].

As for the realm of international relations, regardless of the practical experience with hierarchic methods, the sociopolitical ranking systems have a number of common advantages and shortcomings. First of all, one of the main advantages typical to hierarchic systems is the labor division (specialization), which enables implementing large-scale projects and works. Combination of resources and legitimacy, as evidenced by the historical experience, had allowed handling projects of considerable size. The second advantage is the high degree of integration among the system participants and low transaction costs (which are due to the system participants’ belief and aspiration in focusing on absolute, rather than relative interests and goals) that not only contribute to cooperation among the participants, but also facilitate implementation of future-oriented strategic investments. In such systems, given the high degree of polarity, there is a low likelihood that the conflict will cross the threshold of an open and direct

¹ It has to be noted that hierarchic international relations cannot be directly compared or equalized to the imperial governance methods.

violence [14]. Of course, along with the advantages, the hierarchic systems also have vulnerabilities or disadvantages. Although it is true that high degree of integration decreases the likelihood that a conflict will get out of hand, but if does, then given the large volume of resources invested “together”, its effects would be graver than under different circumstances [14].

Theoretically, in developed countries the commercial contracts reflect the perfectly functional thesis typical to hierarchic systems: monitoring, dispute resolution and enforcement [15]. The emergence of a hierarchic structure in the private sector is due to the participants’ desire to decrease the transaction costs under incomplete awareness (even under a hierarchy the monitoring and regulation functions are limited), which according to some British scientists may lead to an incompetent intervention [16]. On the other hand, it is invoked by the necessity of establishing a stable institutional environment, so as to focus on the long-term, predictable and absolute common interests. Explanation to the drivers and peculiarities of the mentioned phenomenon in the private sector offered by O. Williamson, a Nobel Prize winner [17], prompted some scholars to suggest that models of hierarchic interrelationship also exist in the international relations. Unlike the private sector though, the primary “goods” in international relations are the national *security*, as well as the social and economic well-being and domestic order, which are subject to the logic of hierarchic distribution: “international relations resembles the world of firms in that the provision of security can require replacing anarchy (market) with hierarchical governance structures (firms)” [18].

In addition, it is obvious that hierarchic structures, whether solid organizations or formats based on bilateral agreements, the management and coordina-

tion costs are significant and long-lasting. For countries in subordinate relationship accepting the legitimacy and power of the central force comes at a price, which could have both economic and political dimensions. For example, a K. Hancock [19] suggests that costs and benefits of a hierarchic system can be as follows:

	Benefits	Costs
<i>Subordinate state</i>	a. Financial assistance b. Military assistance	a. Incompatible policy choices b. Domestic policy losses
<i>Dominant state</i>	a. Greater policy control b. Domestic political benefits	a. Financial costs b. Commitments c. International political risks

Peculiarities of the Hierarchic Systems at the Regional Level

The phenomenon of hierarchy in international relations is conceptually based on existence of two parametric key measures: *material* disparity (for example in military and economic areas) and sustained inequality factors in *political* (power) relations. Empirically, even though there are (have been) significant differences in forming and maintaining hierarchy, still a common “hierarchical regional system can be defined as a regional international system composed of a single Great Power and a number of relatively small states” [20, p. 18]. Zimmerman contends that another important reality of a regional system is that the relevant decision makers think it exists and behave accordingly, as it was the case with the Organization of American States or Eastern European countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization [20, pp. 19-20].

In this context it is important to differentiate unipolar system, hegemony and hierarchy. A unipolar system implies concentration of material means and resources, whereas hegemony involves an entirety of both material and non-

material (ideological dimension, values and norms) factors. In this light, hierarchy as phenomenon in international relations is focused not only on formal, but also on relative (variable) power relations between a state with dominant aspirations and those dependent on the latter.

In reviewing the relation between hierarchy and regional systems, it has to be noted above all that hierarchical relations are dyadic in nature: in this type of relations one state accepts the dominant role and status of the other within the framework of an existing system. However, these types of relationships between the dominant state and geographically contiguous states within a common (macro)region may break grounds for establishment of a regional hierarchical system. Apart of political dimension, which clearly is interrelated with the international legitimacy of the dominant state, in D. Lake's opinion the hierarchic relations between the two actors additionally could spur forward the *economies of scale*, which significantly reduce the costs of further expansion and at the same time create incentives for expansion. Worded differently, if a hegemonic state initially bears large costs for a subordinated state (e.g. USA – Panama: building a military base, related infrastructure, other economic and financial costs), then establishing subordination relations with the neighboring states may, understandably, decrease the costs of further expansion (e.g. thanks to using material or human assets stationed in Panama to expand to the neighboring states) [21].

Along with the features of the hierarchical governance schemes put in practice by a hegemon state, the regional systems are also based on certain principles. The regions where *balance of power* and conflicting relations are present, in definition by B. Buzan and O. Wæver are characterized by “a pattern of secu-

rity interdependence shaped by fear of war and expectations of the use of violence in political relations” [22]. However, security systems can be built also based on other values, such as the *security community (pluralistic)* in North America and Western Europe, or the *security regimes* and regional *power “concert”* (South America).

The post-Soviet region, viewed as a separate security system, is described as a unipolar structure: “security regime, Russian hegemony/regional power concert” [23].

In our opinion, given the dynamics and structural attributes of the developments in Eurasia since the collapse of the Soviet Union [24], it is possible to “derive” a few dimensions of the regional hierarchy. *First*, it is the presence of a regional system (especially a security system) and disparity in material resources possessed by Russia on one hand, and the combined potentials of all other post-Soviet countries on the other. According to A. Hurrell, one of the important systemic characteristics of the international arena is the existence of an alternative between power balancing or unequal (hierarchical) relations, which, inter alia, are caused by impossibility of balancing policies against the hegemon state [25, p. 120]. A number of American experts and scholars since mid-2000s have argued that a hypothetical attempt of direct balancing by all post-Soviet countries as a unified force against Russia is simply hopeless due to resource disparity. “In terms of aggregate indicators of military might, the region is just as primed for hegemony as it was in 1995: none of Russia’s neighbors has managed to enhance its relative share of military power to any significant degree” [26].

Second, the key indicators of regional hierarchical relations are the degree and parameters of policy convergence (foreign policy, security and defense poli-

cies, socioeconomic development, etc.) around the axis of the dominant state's strategic interests. Despite of the complex and composite nature of this indicator, the policy convergence turns critical if the dominant state uses either coercive means/force, or puts in practice certain rules and institutes at the regional level. These are based on the dominant interest of the hierarchical state while the subordinate states follow the path not so much because of the coercive force application, but rather, due to the political image and states that the dominant actors wields (power). In the post-Soviet space, if taken from the perspective of defining the priorities and main directions of foreign policies, the factor of a structural preponderance is of critical importance as it is a powerful macro-leverage to influence the course of action and behavior paths by the smaller states. The concept of structural power is generally understood as a combination of the following factors (as a foreign policy resource of a state aimed at controlling its environment): security; production; credit and finance; knowledge, beliefs and ideas [27].

Although different power centers utilize their structural power in a varying degree and with the different success in order to determine the political preferences and foreign policy behaviors of the post-Soviet countries, much depends on the institutionalization extent of the structural influence. M. Mastanduno suggests that hegemon states not only endeavor to dominate over the other states, but also to achieve acceptance of the other great powers as to their "right" to set the rules of the game within the given international subsystem [25, p. 123]. In this sense, establishment and institutional strengthening of the Eurasian Union were aimed at consolidation of the Russian Federation's influence, which in turn is directed to achieving the ultimate goal of policy convergence. Empiri-

cal experience shows that many powerful states in practice are not too much prone to foster regional institutionalization, because the relevant primary foreign policy goals are easier to achieve through unilateral or bilateral strategies [28]. However, at the same time it has to be taken into consideration that the regional hierarchy maintenance costs also include those for ensuring inregional and extra-regional (international) legitimacy.

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ECONOMIC CRISIS AND KONDRATIEV THEORY

Ishkhan Sokhakyani

1. What is the economic crisis?

From the point of view of economists, the crisis in the global market economy (namely that type of economy) is a quite objective and even predictable phenomenon. This is due to economic cycles, including economic crises. What is the reason for this?

The economic cycle is a periodic fluctuation of business activity level, represented by the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). GDP encompasses everything produced in a country, including goods, services, etc.

It is obvious, that GDP is constantly growing (see bold line in Fig. 1), but its rate fluctuates. That is why we see from time to time either economic growth (ascending lines in the graph in Fig. 1) or recession (descending lines in the graph in Fig. 1)¹.

Different economists define different duration of economic cycles, which is due to their various interpretations of the reasons for recurrence of some of the macroeconomic situations.


What are the reasons for cyclic recurrence? Here we find various preconditions. The most known one consists in consumption patterns that are the fundamental principle of the modern market economy. What is the current eco-

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¹ *Novichkov N.V.*, World financial crisis: between the past and the future // Modern Europe. - M.: Europe Institute RAS. 2009, №3.

Fig. 1

*Scheme of the economic cycle in a country with market economy
(GDP, cycle time: 8-11 years)*



economic model? The entrepreneur wants to produce goods and earn money. He or she raises a credit in a bank (the second fundamental principle of modern market economy) and invests it in the production. The company manufactures a product, and the consumer buys it. The earned money is received by entrepreneur, bank, company employees (for consumption and savings), and is also invested in the production of a new item, etc. The basis of all the economy consists in the need (someone's unfulfilled vital desire), which creates the demand (economically active desire), which, in its turn, gives rise to the supply (option to meet the demand). Paraphrasing a classical writer, we can say, "We consume therefore we exist". This is the main point, the essence and the fundamental principle not only of the economic development of all countries and nations, but certainly also of economic downturns, crises and depressions.

The point is that sooner or later the consumption growth is impeded, then stalls or can turn into overproduction crisis.

Certainly, the crisis is not perpetual, sooner or later it will give way to the economic growth. In Fig. 1 the segment AB represents economic growth, the segment BC - recession or crisis, the segment CD - depression or deepening of economic crisis, the segment DE - recovery, rehabilitation, or beginning of a new economic growth.

As we can see in the figure, the duration of business cycles is 8-11 years. These are so-called mid-cycles (caused by technical and technological upgrades), as well as short-term (related to the peculiarities of economic conditions), and long-term cycles (e.g. Kondratiev's cycles, associated with the change of technological structures).

There is a question, why economic crises became a reality just the last 200 years, and why crises are financial by nature?

We will take an indirect approach in answering this question. All objective processes in the world around us have fluctuating (or wave-form) nature, and the social life is not an exception. J.B.Clark, the patriarch of American economic thought, described the cyclic recurrence quite figuratively: "In the modern world, economic cycles are considered in the same way as ancient Egyptians considered flooding of the Nile. This phenomenon appears from time to time and is essential for everyone, but its real reasons are hidden". A well-known Russian economist Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky in his book "Principles of Political Economy", wrote about the laws governing the functioning of the market: "The most mysterious and destructive feature of capitalist development is its recurrence. The growth of capitalist production does not follow a straight line but a wavy one, and successive rises and falls of the waves occur with such regularity that resembles the phenomenon of not a social, but biological and even inor-

ganic order. There were even attempts to bring this periodicity into connection with the periodicity of astronomical phenomena".

Obviously, due to the growing influence of nation-states, international institutions, as well as wide range of non-economic (political, military, technological, environmental and other) factors, and scientific and technological progress the "correctness" of cycles' course was disturbed. However, we cannot deny the objective character of their existence.

We will assume that the cycles appeared with the advent of mankind and always existed since then. However, at the beginning of the 19th century, just after the end of the Napoleonic wars, the world changed fundamentally. It became capitalist in the sense that capital, money and finance defeated military power and became a major factor of power. Before the Napoleonic Wars, the one with the strongest army was the most powerful. Wars were a source of enrichment – the winner plundered the defeated. The defeat of Napoleon – the most outstanding general of the time, who had the strongest army in the world – demonstrated a simple truth: the richest one, rather than the one with best soldiers has the most power. The war between France and England's manufacturers ended with the absolute victory of capitalists. Since then, and to date the world has had a financial nature, and therefore – the ups and downs of the financial world influence us. Even wars are no more a source of enrichment; they have become an instrument of competition for access to markets, resources, infrastructure, etc.

Since then, finances concern everything; they underlie all phenomena and events of our life, and this is the objective reality. Soviet strategists did not take into consideration the priority of financial issues and got the Soviet Union in-

volved in the arms race. The country with the largest and, without exaggeration, the most powerful army, was completely defeated by the West because of economic backwardness and the failure to ensure an equal financial power.

It came, particularly for historical reasons, that actually money is the main source of everything, and its deficit means the collapse of the world economy.

2. Were there economic crises before?

We can refer the starting point of cyclic development of the market economy to the 1825, when England encountered the first crisis of overproduction. This initiated periodic fluctuations of economy, repeating quite regularly during the 19th century, with an average interval of 8-11 years. With the development of capitalism, other capitalist countries gradually got involved into cycling course. In 1836, the crisis hit both England and the USA. The crisis of 1847 raged already in the United States, Britain, France and Germany, and the next crisis of 1858 was, in fact, the first global cyclical crisis¹. The great global economic crisis of 1873-1878 became the deepest and the longest one in the 19th century.

In the twentieth century the global crisis of 1929-1933 (the so-called "Great Depression") broke all records for economic recession. During this crisis the total volume of industrial production in capitalist countries decreased by 46%, the foreign trade turnover - by 67%, the unemployment reached the level of 26 million people (almost a quarter of all people employed in the sphere of material production) and real incomes declined by 58% on the average.

It was during the "Great Depression", when the state took the charge over the situation in the financial market and created conditions for the economic

¹ Novichkov N.V., World financial crisis: between the past and the future // Modern Europe. - M.: Europe Institute RAS. 2009, №3.

recovery for the first time. The basic anti-crisis plan, proposed by President Roosevelt ("New Deal"), included the following steps:

- Establishment of state control over the financial system to channel financial resources to the development of the economy,
- Creation of new jobs, including those, created with the help of the Institute of Public Works,
- Stimulating domestic demand and private investments of citizens.

All these steps provide an effective demand and economic growth.

These measures were theoretically substantiated by the famous American economist John Maynard Keynes in his "General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money." The basis of the Keynesianism consists in the concept of state regulation of the economy, which significantly increases the role of public institutions in investment promotion and effective demand.

It is obvious, that all of the mentioned measures from "New Deal" of Roosevelt and Keynes's concepts are still relevant nowadays and are used in modern Russia.

After the Second World War financial crises occurred, for example, in 1957-58, 1973-75, 1980-82 etc.

The global financial crisis of 1997-98 that affected Asia ("the Asian financial crisis"), Latin America and Eastern Europe, including Russia, was one of the recent ones. Among developed countries, Japan that is closely linked with its Asian neighbors was hurt most severely. At the same time leading European economies and North America have been affected by the crisis to a much less extent. The current financial crisis is the first in the new millennium. The world economy has not known such large-scale disturbances in the new century yet.

Furthermore, financial crises have been global never before. Even the Great Depression did not touch directly, for example, the current BRICS countries that constitute almost a half of the global economy. The current crisis is unique, because it is really global. It means that it concerns all regions, countries, sectors, enterprises and world economies.

3. What are Kondratiev waves/cycles?

Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kondratiev (in some sources also referred to as Kondratieff, March 4, 1892 –September 17, 1938) was a Russian economist, who was a proponent of the New Economic Policy (NEP), which promoted small private, free market enterprises in the Soviet Union. He is best known for proposing the theory that Western capitalist economies have long term (50 to 60 years) cycles of boom followed by depression. These business cycles are now called "Kondratiev waves".

Nikolai Dimitrievich Kondratiev was born on March 4, 1892 in the province of Kostroma, north of Moscow, to a peasant family of Komi ethnic heritage. He was tutored at the University of St. Petersburg before the 1917 Russian Revolution by Mikhail Tugan-Baranovsky. A member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, his initial professional work was in the area of agricultural economics and statistics and the problem of food supplies. On 5 October 1917, at the age of 25, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Supply of the last Alexander Kerensky government, which lasted for only a few days.

After the revolution, Kondratiev pursued academic research. In 1919, he was assigned to a teaching post at the Agricultural Academy of Peter the Great. In October 1920 he founded the Institute of Conjuncture, in Moscow. As

its first director, he developed it into a large and respected institution with 51 researchers by 1923.

In 1922 he published his first writing on long cycles., *The World Economy and its Conjunctures During and After the War*. His writing that capitalist economies were characterized by successions of expansion and decline contradicted the Marxist idea of the imminent collapse of capitalism. In 1923, Kondratiev intervened in the debate about the "Scissors Crisis", following the general opinion of his colleagues. In 1923–25, he worked on a five-year plan for the development of Soviet agriculture. In 1924, after publishing his first book, presenting the first tentative version of his theory of major cycles, Kondratiev traveled to England, Germany, Canada and the United States, and visited several universities before returning to Russia. In 1925 he published his book *The Major Economic Cycles* which quickly was translated into German. A short form was published in 1935 in the *Review of Economic Statistics* and for a time his ideas became popular in the West, until eclipsed by those of John Maynard Keynes.

Kondratiev's economic cycle theory held that there were long cycles of about fifty years. In the beginning of the cycle economies produce high cost capital goods and infrastructure investments creating new employment and income and a demand for consumer goods. However, after a few decades the expected return on investment falls below the interest rate and people refuse to invest, even as overcapacity in capital goods gives rise to massive layoffs, reducing the demand for consumer goods. Unemployment and a long economic crisis ensue as economies contract. People and companies save their resources until confidence begins to return and there is an upswing into a new capital formation period, usually characterized by large scale investment in new technologies.

A member of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and a proponent of the Soviet New Economic Policy (NEP) supported by Vladimir Lenin, Kondratiev was influential with writings about agriculture and planning methodology. Influenced by his trips overseas, he advocated a market-led industrialization strategy emphasizing export of agricultural produce to pay for industrialization, following the Ricardian economics theory of comparative advantage. He proposed a plan for agriculture and forestry from 1924 to 1928. However, after the death of Lenin in 1924, Joseph Stalin, who favored complete government control of the economy, took control of the Communist Party. Kondratiev's influence quickly waned.

According to the late Harvard sociologist Carle C. Zimmerman, Kondratiev was reported to Soviet authorities by a member of the University of Minnesota agriculture faculty in 1927 after a visit to sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, a fellow Komi: "Kondratieff (sic), an agricultural economist and student of business cycles, visited Minnesota in 1927 and stayed with Sorokin. A number of prominent American scientists were pro-communist at the time. One was a forester at the Ag campus where I had an office. He upbraided me for associating with Sorokin and Kondratieff and told me he was going to send a report about Kondratieff back to Russia. Later I learned that Kondratieff was arrested immediately after returning to Russia from the trip to see American universities. However, he was not given the final "treatment" until the Stalinist purges of 1931."

Kondratiev was removed from the directorship of the Institute of Conjuncture in 1928 and arrested in July 1930, accused of being a member of a "Peasants Labour Party" (allegedly a non-existent party invented by the NKVD). Convicted as a "kulak-professor" and sentenced to 8 years in prison, Kondratiev

served his sentence, from February 1932 onwards, at Suzdal, near Moscow. Although his health deteriorated under poor conditions, Kondratiev continued his research and decided to prepare five new books, as he mentioned in a letter to his wife. Some of these texts were indeed completed and were published.

His last letter was sent to his daughter, Elena Kondratieva, on 31 August 1938. In September 1938 during Stalin's Great Purge, he was subjected to a second trial, condemned to ten years without the right to correspond with the outside world. However, Kondratiev was executed by a firing squad on the same day the sentence was issued. Kondratiev was 46 at the time of his execution.

In the 1970s increased interest in business cycles led to the rediscovery of Kondratiev's work, including the first-time publication of a complete English translation of his seminal article "The Long Waves in Economic Life" in the journal *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* in 1979 (the article was originally published in a German journal in 1926 and a partial English translation appeared in the journal *The Review of Economic Statistics* in 1935). This rediscovery of Kondratiev in English-speaking academia led to his theories being extended for the first time beyond economics as, for example, political scientists such as Joshua Goldstein and geographers such as Brian Berry extended the concept of Kondratiev long waves into their own fields. However, Kondratiev's theory remains controversial because, among other issues, of his ideas about the periodical character of the replacement of basic capital goods and the empirical possibility of coincidence in identifying long waves (i.e. that long waves are simply an epiphenomenon).

In 1987 the Soviet Union officially rehabilitated Kondratiev. His select works were first translated into English by Stephen S. Wilson in 1998. In 1992,

to commemorate the centenary of his birth, the International N. D. Kondratiev Foundation was established in Russia.

By 1926, the great economist Nikolai Kondratiev completed the establishment of the theory of large cycles in the economy. Kondratiev's research covered the 150-years development of the leading capitalist countries - the U.S., Germany, England and France. Using the methods of mathematical statistics, Kondratiev analyzed a wide range of indicators of economic development in these countries: price indices, government debt securities, nominal wages, foreign trade, coal, gold, iron, lead production etc. Based on the statistical data, Kondratiev hypothesized the existence of the long cycles of economic situation lasting 48-55 years, along with the usual 8-11-year cycles.

The turnover of long cycles is due to changing technological structures, that is, depends on the way of main products and services production in the economy. Thus, Kondratiev and his followers marked out five principle cycles in the economy (see Table 1)¹. Formally, we currently deal with the beginning of the fifth "information and communication" technological system and the fifth economic cycle for the last 200 years. But, it is obvious that the Kondratiev's technical and economic cycles overlap each other, and we can talk only about the dominance of a particular way of life in the presence of elements of the previous and the next one.

¹ *Glaziev S.Y.*, Theory of the long-term technical and economic development. – M., P.96-99

Table 1

Kondratiev's long economic cycles according to their technological structures

Features of a cycle	Economic cycle				
	1	2	3	4	5
Period of time	1770-1830	1830-1880	1880-1930	1930-1980	1980-2030
The main branch of technological order	Textile industry, textile machinery, iron smelting, iron processing, sewer construction, water engine	Steam engine, railway construction, development of transport, engineering, steam engine, coal industry, machine-tool industry, ferrous metallurgy	Electrical, heavy engineering industries, production and rolling of steel, electricity transmission lines, inorganic chemistry	Motor and tractor industry, nonferrous metallurgy, durable goods manufacturing, synthetic materials, organic chemistry, oil production and refining	Electronic industry, computer engineering, fiber optics, software, telecommunications, robot-building, gas production and processing, information technologies and services
Key factor	Textile machines	Steam engine	Electric engine, steel	Internal combustion engine, petrochemistry	Microelectronic components, ???
Leading countries	Great Britain	Great Britain, France, the USA	The USA, Germany, Great Britain, France, Switzerland	The USA, Japan, EU	???

Actually scientists are inclined to the view that the world economy is now "influenced by the end" of the previous, fourth techno-economic cycle, characterized by mass production and consumption of durable goods, including automobiles, household appliances and electronics. Another factor that indicates this influence of the fourth cycle, is an "insatiable" energy consumption observed in the developed world in recent years, which led to an unprecedented increase in oil prices in the spring and summer of 2008, when the price for a Brent barrel almost reached the level of U.S. \$ 150.

4. What was the starting point of the current global financial crisis?

We started to talk about the crisis in 2006, immediately after the appearance of signs of the U.S. mortgage crisis.

What is the root cause of what happened? It is very important for almost every American to have his or her own house. Not apartment and cottage, which is typical for us, but a house (two - or three-storey one) with a small plot of land.

U.S. banks (all largest ones) provided mortgage loans for everyone with minimal provision for the construction or purchase of new or already constructed houses. Under these loans new loans were given and so on - a huge pyramid like Russian MMM built at the time. Now imagine that the house, which was bought for the very first loan, was not built, or dropped in value, or its owner cannot repay the loan anymore for some reason. As a result this entire pyramid had to collapse sooner or later. A multibillion bubble bursts at once. And this credit game involved almost all the financial systems of the world that were confident in the high efficiency of the U.S. economy. Today, many of

them, for example the one of Iceland (this small country is on the verge of bankruptcy), are in an extremely uncomfortable situation.

The mortgage crisis, as it is known, was just the beginning of the financial crisis. Multibillion-dollar losses of financial institutions involved in the mortgage market, led to the withdrawal of financial resources from other industries and markets, prompting the so-called chain reaction, when one crisis creates another.

Investments from all over the world were made in equity of these financial institutions, and therefore the mortgage crisis became a financial one and spread to other countries and continents.

5. How long will the crisis last?

According to the past experience the recession is unlikely to last for more than three years, however the world has seen longer lasting crises.

The longest test in the history of the capitalist economy was the crisis of 1873-1878 that spread over almost all continents. The precondition for this crisis was the credit rise in Latin America, nourished by England and the speculative boom in real estate in Germany and Austria. The Great Depression began on October 24 1929 (the Black Thursday) and was largely overcome only in 1933, although the effects of the crisis could be felt up to late 1930s. The Asian-Russian crisis of 1997-1998 lasted almost two years. The modern global financial crisis lasted already five years, considering that it began in 2008.

What can we expect from the modern economy in near future?

There are several points of view on this issue. Some economists think that the world economy has reached the very bottom and the decrease in energy prices will cause a decrease in costs and create conditions for new economic

growth. This point of view has the right to exist, but it should be considered that global economy is developing irregularly.

If the mortgage crisis that broke out in the USA at the turn of 2006-2007 is more or less coming to an end, the recession in Europe and Japan is only starting to gain momentum, and some large Asian and Latin-American economies are barely approaching the downturn. Considering the world economy is a single, yet managed from different centers, system, the improvement of the world economy is only to come after the majority of national economies make it through the crisis - which is certainly not going to happen in the short-term.

Other economists think that the crisis is "here to stay" as the modern economic model based on egoism and parasitism has become obsolete. It is impossible to develop further if some countries of the world "create nothing on their own" and live at other countries' expense. Indeed, the US economy, recently so oversaturated with money, has found itself in the liquidity deficit conditions. All these hundreds of billions of dollars, not so long ago circulating in the fund, mortgage, currency etc. markets of the USA - where have they all gone? Perhaps, there were no billions of dollars in the first place? Perhaps, that was, so to say, "unreal", "virtual" money, that was not earned (or not "labor money", according to Marx)? Perhaps it is necessary to find other ways of enrichment, that hadn't been used before.

Thus, before the election for the second presidential term the American President Barack Obama asked voters for the extra time to steer the economy through the crisis.

As for Russia, the country along with all the major emerging markets is only entering a phase of the economic downturn and, officially, the recession

have recently occurred: the decline in production is not yet catastrophic, the inflation is within certain limits, the state budget still has enough of money.

There is much talk about the second and subsequent waves of the global crisis. They are already becoming real. While the first wave, one way or another, has been associated with the U.S. mortgage lending crisis, it is obvious that the second one is primarily based on the sovereign debt of the EU members, in particular, its "southern belt" - Greece, Spain and Italy. At the same time, the large-scale financial crisis in Asia and Latin America is probably still to come.

6. What were the symptoms of the crisis? When did they start to appear?

The first symptoms of the financial crisis became apparent in 2006 with the advent of first crisis phenomena in the American economy related to mortgage lending.

Almost all the companies providing home loans in the U.S. with low lending standards reported losses. A number of second-tier mortgage operators announced their withdrawal from the market, and in some cases, bankruptcy.

Back then, few could have predicted that this would be the beginning of a global recession, and difficulties with the repayment of mortgage loans in the U.S. would lead to a global economic fall.

In 2007, the mortgage crisis unexpectedly spread around. The crisis in the U.S. mortgage market went to Europe. The world system began to suffer from liquidity shortage.

The main symptom of the crisis became obvious, and after this, it became clear that the coming recession would be very serious. The question is about the mass exodus of investors from the stock market and their flow to other sectors, such as commodity markets.

The world economy felt such evasion first-hand, when vast resources of the speculative capital came to the oil market. Within the period between early 2007 and mid-2008, the price for this energy source went up by almost \$90 (approximately from 60 to 150) per barrel.

In Russia, this has resulted in the flow of financial resources to the real estate market, especially in housing, which led to the rapid growth in housing prices in Russian cities.

In general, the main sign of any crisis consists in an "abnormal", massive capital outflow from one sector (e.g., financial) to another (such as commodity), or vice versa. There is nothing unusual in the capital flow; this is a normal phenomenon in the modern economy. What is abnormal is the excessive concentration of the capital in any one industry.

Economic equilibrium implies that at the same time the profitability of various business activities is practically equal to the fluctuations within a few percent (the economic variant of communicating vessels). Investments in real estate, mutual funds, deposits, securities, etc. should be about the same. The situation where investments in real estate or in oil speculations are several times more profitable than deposits or mutual funds, of course, is not normal, and sooner or later, leads to the crisis in the economy. This situation reminds of the ship, where all the passengers with the luggage accumulated on the deck near one of the broadsides, which inevitably complicated the further movement of the ship and could even lead to a shipwreck.

7. Is the current crisis similar to the crisis phenomena in the global and Russian economy in 1997-98?

It has already been mentioned that the crisis of 1997-98 was not global, so it is, partly, not like the current one.

However, the Russian-Asian crisis is interesting for us because Russia and most of its citizens were directly involved in it.

What were the main characteristics of the crisis?

The Asian crisis was a consequence of the foreign investors' departure from South-East Asia due to the devaluation of national currencies in the region, and high external deficit of the countries in the region.

It is assumed that the crisis in Russia was caused by the following factors:

- a huge state, first of all, foreign debt of Russia,
- low oil prices, on which Russia has traditionally depended,
- pyramid of short-dated bonds, for which the Russian government has failed to repay in time.

As a result, in August 17, 1998, the government of Sergei Kiriyenko announced "technical default" of \$40 billion thus recognizing Russia's and its banks' failure to pay its credit obligations and that led to the collapse of many financial institutions that invested in short-term bonds, the ruin of many businesses and loss of ordinary citizens' deposits in many Russian banks. Rate of the ruble against the dollar in August 1998 - January 1999 fell by more than 3 times - from 6 rubles to 21 rubles per US dollar. The prices for goods and services also rose more than threefold in average.

Certainly, now the situation is somewhat different: Russia does not have "catastrophic" internal and external debts. Moreover, there are significant gold

and foreign exchange reserves and the Reserve Fund, and oil prices did not fall to the level of, say, \$10 or 30 per barrel. It can be argued that Russia was prepared to the crisis thanks to its capacities.

However in 1997-1998 the most part of the world economy was not in a crisis and, in this regard, the country could count on foreign support - through foreign loans and investments. It is not by chance that 2000 became a record year for the last 20 years in terms of the volume of attracted investments into the real sector of the Russian economy, which allowed Russia to gain a strong economic growth observed in the last 10 years. Now Russia should to a lesser degree rely on the help of foreign countries, international institutions and foreign investors due to the fact that now the whole world economy is experiencing an extreme shortage of liquidity and is in a great need of investments.

Another distinctive feature of this crisis is the fact that its causes lay outside Russia. The crisis events in Russia are consequence, and therefore let us hope that the depth of the economic recession in Russia will be less catastrophic.

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ARMENIAN, GREEK, AND JEWISH PRINTED AND ONLINE MEDIA IN TURKEY

*Gevorg Petrosyan**

For decades the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish media in Turkey continued to publish periodicals. They currently face problems due to the lack of funds and difficulty to sell printed media in the Internet era. Decreasing number of Armenian, Greek, and Jewish communities and those who can read in their mother tongue is another problem. Media transformations occurring in the world impact also the media of Turkey's ethnic and religious minorities. These media now pay more attention to online publications or at least boost their presence in the internet.

Armenian and Armenian-language media

Over the years not only print-runs of ethnic minority periodicals has decreased, but also their number has declined. For comparison, in the beginning of the 20th century in the Ottoman Empire (including outside Constantinople) more than 15 Armenian periodicals were published, whereas currently there only two dailies in Armenian language [1]:

In Turkey currently *Jamanak* and *Nor Marmara* dailies are published (both in Western Armenian language), the *Agos* weekly (in Western Armenian and Turkish), as well as a number of magazines such as *Paros*, *Luys*, *Shoghakat*, *Lraber*, etc. The websites of printed Armenian media are launched. The official

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website of Istanbul-published *Agos* is especially noteworthy as it represents an information-rich and up-to-date news site. Recently *Jamanak* daily relaunched its updated website.

Apart from Armenian media, the TRT Turkish government television and radio company's *TRT World* project, which reports news mainly on Turkey in a few dozen languages, also has an Armenian (Eastern Armenian language) version. The Eastern Armenian language news site¹ version of *TRT World* mostly contains translated content of the Turkish version, but it has not been very active. Its Armenian content has many grammatical, orthographical and stylistic mistakes, and displays obvious differences in lingual mentality.

Agos weekly and website

Agos weekly is published since April 1996. The periodical was established by Hrant Dink, Luiz Bakar, Harutioun Sheshetian and Anna Turay, and belongs *Agos* Publishing company led by Rahil Dink. It is a 24-page periodical published weekly. Out of these pages of *Agos* printed version 20 are in Turkish and 4 pages are in Western Armenian.

Hrant Dink was the chief editor of *Agos* until his assassination in 2007. After that editors-in-chief were Etyen Mahchupyan² in 2007-2010, Rober Koptash in 2010-2015 and from January 2015 to date Yetvart Danzikyan³, and Pakrat Estukyan as Armenian Language Editor. The editorial board of the periodical is based in Istanbul. Print-run of *Agos* comprises 4,000-5,000 copies weekly⁴.

¹ TRT World-Հայերեն, official website, <http://www.trt.net.tr/armenian>.

² He was also a chief counsellor to Turkish Prime Minister in 2014-2015.

³ Rober Koptaş'tan veda, Agos'un yeni yayın yönetmeni Yetvart Danzikyan, DemokratHaber, <http://www.demokrathaber.net/medya/rober-koptastan-veda-agosun-yeni-yayin-yonetmeni-yetvart-danzikyan-h44077.html>.

⁴ Azınlıkların sesi kısık, Radikal, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/azinliklarin_sesi_kisik-1056953.

Agos focuses not only on problems of the Armenian community, but also Turkey's internal and external matters and wide range of topics, such as politics, society, culture, minority issues, human rights and more.

The online version of *Agos* (<http://agos.com.tr>) is quite active¹. It contains both its own news, articles, photo reports and materials from the printed version. Initially the content of *Agos* online was accessible only to paying subscribers, but in the recent years the news website is open to all readers. Unlike the printed version, *Agos* online offers information not only in Turkish and Armenian, but also in English. However, the main section is in Turkish. *Agos* website is often attacked by Turkish hackers², and targeted by nationalistic circles. Article contributors to *Agos* include a renowned Turkish historian Baskın Oran, as well as Vahagn Keshishian, Pakrat Estukyan, Yetvart Danzikyan, Bercuhi Berberyan and others³.

Marmara / Nor Marmara daily and online

Marmara is among the oldest and most reputable Armenian periodicals published in Turkey. In 1967 it was renamed *Nor Marmara* [2, էջ 82]. The newspaper represents itself as a “political-public daily.” It was established by Armenian journalist Souren Shamlian and the first issue was published on August 31, 1940⁴. The newspaper is published six times a week (no Sunday issues). Robert Haddeciyan (also known in Turkey as Robert Haddeler)⁵, is the editor-in-chief of the newspaper since 1967. The editorial board is based in Istanbul. *Nor Mar-*

¹ Agos official website, <http://www.agos.com.tr/>.

² Թուրք հաքերները հարձակվել են «Ակօսի» կայքի վրա, Թուրազիտական պորտալ, <http://allturkey.am/10759>.

³ Yazarlar, Agos, <http://www.agos.com.tr/tr/yazarlar?page=1>.

⁴ Նոր Մարմարա, Մեր մասին, <http://www.normarmara.com/mermasin.html>.

⁵ Ermeni gazeteleri, ESI, http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=tr&id=322&debate_ID=4&slide_ID=7.

mara is published in Western Armenian language, although Friday issues sometimes contain also articles in Turkish. With a print-run of 1,000-1,500, the newspaper has 4 pages. Its online version¹ (<http://www.normarmara.com>), which currently is only in Western Armenian language, has been more active in the recent months. It contains mostly materials from the printed version. For a long time the online version simply displayed the copy of the newspaper's issue of a particular day, but in 2015 the website has been upgraded, with added archive, separate section on the Editor-in-Chief Haddecian's books, etc. The updated newsfeed contains news not only about Armenians of Turkey, but also information on Turkey's internal and foreign policy developments.

Jamanak daily and website

Jamanak is the oldest Armenian language periodical in Turkey, as well as the oldest newspaper in Turkey published continuously, without any interruptions². The newspaper represents itself a "political popular daily".

Jamanak is published only in Western Armenian language and has four pages. It was founded in 1908 by Misak and Sarkis Kochunyan brothers. Since its foundation Kochunyan family members served as editors-in-chief of this Armenian newspaper. Ara Kochunyan has taken the office in 1992 and since then is the editor-in-chief of the daily. In 1920-30s the newspaper was published combined with another paper under the name *Joghovurti Dzayn Jamanak*, and later also as *Jamanak Turkia* [2, էջ 82]. The editorial office is located in Istanbul and the print-run is 1,500-2,000 copies³. Unfortunately, the print-run of *Jamanak* as

¹ Nor Marmara official website, <http://www.normarmara.com/marmara.htm>.

² Böyle olur Jamanak Gazetesi'nin kutlaması!, T24, 2013, <http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/raffi-a-hermonn/boyle-olur-jamanak-gazetesinin-kutlamasi,6790>.

³ Teknolojiye direnen azınlıklar, Aksiyon, 1995, <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-1166-34-teknolojiye-direnen-azinliklar.html>.

well as other Armenian periodical published in Turkey has been decreasing year to year, which is due to diminishing numbers of Armenian readership and growing use of internet.

Jamanak focuses on problems and everyday life of the Armenian community in Turkey and generally the whole Armeniacy, and also covers other topics, including political and social.

Many Armenian intellectuals have been contributors to the paper, including Daniel Varujan, Krikor Zohrab, Vahan Tekeyan, Ruben Sevak, Zabel Yesayan, Hovhannes Tumanyan, Yervant Oadian, among others.

After certain time of inactivity on the internet, *Jamanak* relaunched its website (<http://www.jamanak.com/>) in early 2015, with support from Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation¹. The website is in Western Armenian language only. The website contains news, analytical articles, interviews, editorials regarding the life of Armenians in Turkey, about Armenia and all Armeniacy, as well as an archive of the issues published from 2006 to 2009².

Armenian Magazines Published in turkey

A number of Armenian magazines are published in Turkey that are owned by the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople or are privately held. The magazines of the Armenian community of Turkey are established by relatively recently and are privately owned. *Paros* monthly is published in Turkish language since 2011 in Istanbul. It mostly covers public life and stays away from political topics. Its website³ is also only in Turkish language.

¹ Ժամանակ, official website: <http://www.jamanak.com/>.

² Ժամանակ, արխիվ, [http://www.jamanak.com/arxivpdf?field_date_value\[value\]=&page=42](http://www.jamanak.com/arxivpdf?field_date_value[value]=&page=42).

³ *Paros*, official website: <http://www.paros.com.tr/>

Luys magazine is published since 2013 in Istanbul, in Turkish language. Mostly covers public life, culture, with no political references. Website of *Luys* has been launched, again in Turkish language only¹.

The Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople published the *Shoghakat* monthly, which covers spiritual life, historical and cultural topics². In addition, the Patriarchate has an official magazine, *Lraper*.

The Surp Pırgıç Armenian Hospital Foundation has its own monthly magazine³, which has been published in different formats since the early 20th century⁴. Also, *Jbid* magazine is published for children⁵.

Greek and Jewish Periodicals

There are Greek and Jewish printed periodicals published in Turkey, which also have problems related to funding, diminishing numbers of community members and development of internet⁶. However, under the circumstances Jews take steps to boost the online version of their community newspaper.

The *Apoyevmatini* (meaning “daytime” in Greek) is published in Istanbul in Greek language by the Greek community. Since recently it is a weekly. It was established in 1925. The paper mostly covers matters of the Greek community. In 1960s its print-run was 35,000 copies, but now it is down to 500-600 due to significant decrease in numbers of the Greeks in Turkey and advent of the new technologies in the 21st century. Only two people work for the newspaper and

¹ *Luys*, official website: <http://www.luys.com.tr/hakkimizda>

² Թուրքիայի հայկական պատրիարքարան, «Շոդակաթ», <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/sogagat-dergisi-basin/>

³ Սուրբ Փրկիչ հայկական հիվանդանոցի հիմնադրամի ամսագիր, <http://www.surppirgic.org/>

⁴ Türkiye Ermenileri Patrikliği, Surp Pırgıç Hastane Dergisi, <http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/surp-pirgic-hastane-dergisi-basin/>.

⁵ *Ibid*.

⁶ Azınlık gazetelerinin varoluş mücadelesi, DW, 2011,

<http://www.dw.de/az%C4%B1n%C4%B1k-gazetelerinin-varolu%C5%9F-m%C3%BCcadelesi/a-15254238>.

they do not even have an office¹. This Greek periodical does not have a website either, due to difficult financing problems.

Greeks in Turkey also publish the *Iho* daily newspaper (meaning “echo” in Greek), which was established in 1977. Since 2012 a radio station was launched, called *Iho Tis Polis* (“Echo of the City”). It is broadcasted as a supplement to the newspaper and is accessible only through internet. The paper contains news about Greeks of Turkey, as well as local and international developments. Due to financial problems the newspaper had to decrease the number of its pages down to four. It does have a website in Greek language². The daily newsfeed along with electronic versions of the printed issues are posted on the website. As already mentioned, the radio broadcast in Greek language can be listened from this website.

The Jews publish *Shalom* newspaper (*Şalom* in Turkish), which was established in 1947. For many years it was published in Latin Hebrew alphabet, and now it also has a page in Turkish language. *Shalom* is published weekly, as a political and cultural periodical. It has an active website³, mostly in Turkish language. With gradual decrease of the printed paper sales, more attention is focused on the online version.

Summary

The continuously shrinking numbers of ethnic minority population in Turkey adversely impacts the community printed media that have been published for decades. Their print-runs tend to decline. Under difficult financial situation

¹ Մտամբուլում լույս տեսնող հունական թերթի գրասենյակը փակվել է, Թուրքագիտական պորտալ, 2014, <http://allturkey.am/10658>.

² *Iho*, <http://www.ihotispolis.com/>.

³ *Şalom*, official website: <http://www.salom.com.tr/>.

these media important for the communities continue to survive mostly thanks to the enthusiasm of their staffs. Another negative trend is observed as well: the media of minorities increasingly prefer Turkish language in their publications, which poses a threat to preserving their mother tongues and identities. For example, the main language of both printed and online versions of *Agos* is Turkish. The Armenian magazines established in the recent years are also in Turkish.

A significant part of media has correctly figured the paradigm shift of modern times and attempts to be more active in the internet. *Agos* was the first among the Armenian media that paid serious attention to the internet, due to which the website of this periodical currently operates actively. After certain period of inaction, both *Jamanak* and *Nor Marmara* relaunched their websites, which are now more technically advanced and have improved updating. Other transformations also indicate that the periodicals of minorities in Turkey make attempts to be more active in the internet, because they understand its significance. Given that *Jamanak* and *Nor Marmara* focus on new reporting in Armenian, their internet activity is important for the pressing issue of preserving Armenianness. The Greek *Iho* also uses the possibilities of internet to carry out radio broadcasting.

Thus, the mass media of Turkey's ethnic minorities continue their important work, often time having to face survival issues. In addition to funding problems, serious challenges are posed by diminishing readership in mother tongue and generally the decreasing numbers of ethnic minority populations. As the time has shown, the future of ethnic minority mass media is largely related to the internet, where they continue making attempts to be more active.

September 2015

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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS LIMITATIONS: CERTAIN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

*Aram Aramyan**

Introduction

No known society anywhere has ever adopted a standard of entirely absolute free speech. According to nearly all free speech scholars, freedom of speech has been understood to have limits. Even in today's liberal democracies there is no idea of unconditional free speech. Almost all freedom of speech scholars and philosophers, except very few in the United States, emphasize that freedom of speech is not absolute, neither in theory, nor in practice¹. Although they all agree on the importance of free speech for discovering the truth, fostering individual self-fulfillment and self-realization and maintaining democracy, they also argue that words can wound and believe that unlimited free speech might prove counter-productive, spreading false statements, destroying democracy, allowing intolerance to flourish, and offending people's dignity and respect. [1, p. 37] The following discussion therefore is not to argue whether freedom of speech is absolute or not, whether it should be restricted or not. The question posed is how much speech should be restricted, by what standards, and by what means?

We will split our discussion in two parts: the limitations found in theory and limitations in practice.

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¹ *Siegel, S.*, "The Death and Rebirth of the Clear and Present Danger Test", 2007, p. 42. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=964553>

1. Limitations in theory

The wide variety of opinions stem from two major schools of thought and their opposing standards for restricting of free speech, standards often referred to as the standard of “harm” and the standard of “offence”. One of the philosophers primarily associated with the “harm” principle is John Stuart Mill, who in his famous work *On liberty* argues: “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” [2, p. 86].

Another school of thought holds that speech, which causes “offence”, should also be subject to restriction of law, at least in some contexts and situations. According to this standard some classes of speech should be regulated for the reason of their offensiveness alone.

1.1 The Harm Principle

The harm principle, in fact, is the most liberal theory that defends free speech, though it simultaneously constitutes a justification for limiting free speech¹. In *On Liberty*, Mill emphasized that freedom of opinion and sentiment should exist in society for everyone, [2, p. 76] on every subject matter, "practical or speculative, scientific, moral or theological" ... "however immoral it may be considered" [2, p. 71]. Even if a person is alone against the whole mankind in adopting certain opinions, even if he/she crosses the social red lines and discusses moral, political, or religious matters, and even if a person's opinion is shocking, unorthodox, or heretical, and false, all these do not provide a ground for prohibiting such speech "[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised

¹ *Van Mill, David*, "Freedom of Speech", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/freedom-speech/>.

over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others," Mill says [2, p. 86]. Only in this case, according to Feinberg, Mill believes in society's need for some rules of conduct that regulate the words of a member of a political society [3, p. 11]. In other words, speech should be free until it unduly harms someone else [2, p. 86].

Mill applies this principle in a far broader context than speech, of course, but he applies an especially strict scrutiny to the claims of harm with relation to speech, and argues that nearly every manner of speech ought to be outside the regulation of law. As such, Mill is favorite among more 'liberal' participants in the speech debate. As one author asserts, "the limits on free speech will be very narrow because it is difficult to support the claim that most speech actually causes harm to the right of others" [5, p. 4].

However, several criticisms have been directed to Mill's harm principle [6, pp. 109-194]. Some view Mill's principle as too broad because speech is 'only words', it cannot harm, thus free speech should be unlimited [7, pp. 220-224]. Others believe that the harm principle is too narrow, and suggest that the harm principle can be defined in a less stringent manner than Mill's formulation, consequently, more options might become available for prohibiting hate speech and violent pornography. This party claims that the harm principle should include within its scope psychological harm to others, as it includes physical harm, "just as we view the infliction of physical pain as a wrongful deed, seeing it as the right and the duty of the state to prohibit such an infliction". As Raphael Cohen-Almagor suggests, there are grounds for abridging expression not only when the speech is intended to bring about physical harm, but also when it is designed to "inflict psychological offence".

Though some of these criticisms are reasonable, regardless of that the principle is still considered by many, if not by nearly all authors, as one of the most influential theories in designing the boundaries for freedom of speech [4, p. 3]. In fact, there is no controversy about this fact, but the controversy arises, as Feinberg says, when we consider whether it is the only valid liberty-limiting principle, as John Stuart Mill believed [2, p. 86]. Many, contrary to Mill, believe that still there is space for other principles, namely, the offence principle, to play a significant role alongside the harm principle in determining the limits of freedom of speech [4, p. 3]. Most liberal societies rely on the offence principle to regulate certain types of speech.

1.2 The Offence Principle

Many societies, even liberal ones, except to some extent the United States, as study will show, have limitations on some harmless forms such as open lewdness, solicitation, indecency of some exotic kinds, distribution of materials with offensive racial and ethnic slurs, displays of swastikas, Holocaust denial, and some sorts of pornography [3, p. 13]. However, there is considerable doubt whether these can be justified by the harm principle, because certain sorts of unpleasant psychological states are not in theory harms per se. This led some, Joel Feinberg in particular, to adopt another theory that can, beside the harm principle, shoulder all of the work necessary for a principle that has to deal with free speech and set the bar a little lower than in the harm principle [3, p. 15]. They found their quest in an additional principle called the offence principle, which permits the imposition of limitations on speech for its supposed offensiveness, rather than the harm that is caused [5, p. 6]. Unlike the harm principle, it is not necessary for speech to set back our interests, for it to be prohibited under

the offence principle. The result of balancing between the seriousness of the offensiveness and the reasonableness of the offending conduct, which might be very complex and uncertain, will determine whether the speech at issue is subjected to offence principle or not [3, 26]. For instance, when the motive of the speaker is merely malicious or spiteful, the offense speech can be reasonable in the eyes of law, or the reasonableness of the offensive speech here has less value on the balancing scale [3, p. 41].

2. Limitations in practice

While the previous section was a theoretical examination of freedom of speech boundaries, the following part concerns the reality of limitations on free speech provisions in international law context, as well as distinguishing the U.S. system, which stands differently. We will examine limitations prescribed by ICCPR, ECHR and the U.S. law within the context of speech protected by these systems.

2.1 The U.S. system

In the United States, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ultimately governs freedom of speech. According to it “Congress shall make no law... abridging freedom of speech”. But contrary to the situation in international law of free speech, there is no determination in the First Amendment’s text about the legal boundaries of freedom of speech.

The Supreme Court has many times expressed that freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment is not absolute¹. No justice according to Wallace Mendelson, “has ever suggested that freedom of speech means freedom to

¹ See *Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/568/case.html> *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/#annotation>; *Whitney v. California*, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/274/357/case.html>

say anything that one might choose at any place.” [8, p. 28]. As an attempt to set a rule that can be considered as reference to determine when speech should not benefit from freedom of speech protection, the Supreme Court in the United States has established several judicial tests that determine the scope of free speech [9, p. 1-8]. Various justices have applied limiting judicial tests to the right of speech, namely, the categorical approach (which identifies specific forms of speech that are subject to regulation); the “bad tendency” test (any expression that had a tendency to lead to substantial evil should be restricted); the “clear and present danger test” (a government may punish speech “that produces or is intending to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils”; the “preferred position” test (which places speech in a position of prominence but acknowledges that free speech is not absolutely free); and the balancing test (which recognizes that when other rights conflict with the right to free speech the competing rights should be balanced to determine which has priority) [10, p. 13].

The methodology that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted, the categorical approach is very different from the corresponding methodology used by both HRC and ECtHR which adopted the balancing approach. The balancing of interests test begins by identifying the societal and personal interests implicated by the legal conflict and assigning differing weights to those interests based on their varying importance to social and individual flourishing¹. Balancing-of-interest jurisprudence, thus, resolves legal conflict by allowing the more important interests to prevail over the less important, or by allowing each interest to prevail to an appropriate extent [11, p. 1352]. In contrast to the balancing test, the cate-

¹ Siegel, S, "The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny." August 2006, p. 4 URL: <http://ssrn.com/abstractX34795>

gorical approach is often referred to as a judicial test set by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in order to determine the scope of free speech protection “by reliance on broad and abstract classification of protected or unprotected speech.” [12, p. 673]. This approach, according to Joshua Cohen, singles out a small set of categories of speech in the First Amendment, for example child pornography, obscenity, fighting words, and express incitement, for lesser protection, specifying conditions for permissible regulation of expression in each category [13, 214]. It is based on the idea of dividing speech activity into categories of protected speech and non-protected speech, and then sub-dividing protected speech into categories [14, p. 7].

Apart from that, it is important to mention the clear and present danger test. The US Supreme Court has set the clear and present danger standard in *Schenck v. United States* in order to judge when the right to free speech may lawfully be regulated. Justice Holmes in *Schenck* illustrated the standard by arguing that “the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”¹ This is because such speech constitutes a “clear and present danger” to public safety. Various formulations of the clear and present danger test, such as *Schenck* test (1919), its successor, *Dennis* test (1951) and *Brandenburg* test (1969) up to the present, have appeared in several significant Supreme Court decisions throughout the years [15, pp. 637-651].

2.2 International Law

International human rights law because of its fundamental role in underpinning democracy among the most important of the rights guarantees freedom of

¹ *Ibid*, *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

speech. The ICCPR¹, taking the wording of the Universal Declaration² almost intact into its Article 19, provides: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression.” However, freedom of expression, according to this article, is not an absolute right. Paragraph 3 stated that: The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals³.

This means international law, in contrast to American law, does not expressly permit some restrictions on the right to freedom of expression and information in order to protect the private and public interests listed in paragraph 3 of Article 19 of ICCPR. In the interpretation of this language the Human Rights Committee has stated “It is the interplay between the principle of freedom of expression and such limitations and restrictions which determines the actual scope of individual’s right”⁴ The Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 10 noted also that permissible restrictions on the right to freedom of expression “may relate either to the interests of other persons or to those of the community as a whole.”⁵ However, the right is further qualified by Article 20,

¹International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

²Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

³International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, <http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

⁴*General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19) 29/06/1983.*

<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralCommentNo10.pdf>

⁵Ibid.

which prohibits war propaganda, incitement to violence and certain forms of hate speech. ICCPR here provides a compulsory restriction on this type of speech [16, p. 517].

Similar to ICCPR, in the context of the ECHR¹, freedom of expression may be subject to limitations prescribed by law. The European states, while designating Article 10 of the Convention, perceived a need to delimit the scope of rights that, if taken literally, would have unlimited breadth, and thus they paid careful attention to the need to design the rights so as simultaneously to ensure their effective protection and also to provide appropriate breathing room for multiplicity of important interests².

Paragraph (2) of Article 10 reads: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”³

It can be said, that freedom of expression in the international law is classic qualified right which should be balanced with other competing interests. This means that, unlike the law of freedom of expression in the U.S., the ICCPR and the ECHR do not adopt “the categorization approach”. Under the ICCPR and

¹ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI.1950, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf

² *Schauer, F.*, "Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study in Comparative Constitutional Architecture," (2005), p. 17, available at URL <http://ssrn.com/abstract668523>>

³ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

ECHR, there is an explicit authorization of a process of balancing the interest in freedom of speech against other countervailing interests¹. For example, in the context of ECHR, the balancing methodology is contained directly in Article 10 (2), which precedes the foregoing list approved countervailing interest with the statement that freedom of expression “since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society.” The ECHR adopted and employed an explicit balancing test under Article 10 in *Sunday Times v. United Kingdom*².

However, this does not mean the international law of free speech opens the gates widely for states to limit the right of freedom of expression. Limitations of this right must meet a strict test of justification³. The Human Rights Committee has consistently said that any restriction imposed on the right of freedom of expression must be required for the purpose of safeguarding one of the legitimate interests noted in Article 19(3)⁴. These limits to freedom of expression are subject to two overriding principles. First, the limits must be “prescribed by law”. This means that the limit must be clearly spelt out in a law. The limiting law must satisfy certain characteristics – it must be accessible, sufficiently circumscribed and clearly predictable in application. Secondly, the limit must also be “necessary”. This imports the notion of proportionality. The limiting measure must be “necessary to achieve one of the aims in 19(3) (a) and (b).”⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

² *The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom* (No 1) 6538/74 [1979] ECHR.

<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57584>

³ *Kim v. Republic of Korea*. CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994,

<https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session64/view574.htm>

⁴ *Wornah Mukong v. Cameroon*, CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991,

<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws458.htm>;

Pietraroia v. Uruguay, 44/1979, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/44_1979.htm

⁵ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>

What can be said about ICCPR, the restrictions on freedom of expression must pass the so-called three-part test, which can also be said in reference to ECHR. The balancing inquiry described in Sunday Times is three-tiered: failure at any tier renders the restriction unlawful under the Convention¹. First, the court must ask whether the interference was “prescribed by law.”² If so, the inquiry turns to whether the interference had aims that are “legitimate under Article 10 (2).”³ Finally the court asks whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society.”⁴ The last test proves to be the most hard for the court to assess positively. The adjective “necessary” implies the existence of a “pressing social need.”⁵ Where the Court finds that all requirements are fulfilled, the State’s interference will be considered legitimate. The burden to prove that all requirements are fulfilled stays with the State. The Court examines the three conditions in the order provided above. Once the Court finds that the State fails to prove one of the requirements, it will not give the case further examination and will decide that the respective interference was unjustified and therefore, freedom of expression violated [17, p. 23].

Conclusion

What the above points demonstrated is that in contrast so seeming absoluteness of the First Amendment, international law of freedom of expression differs from the American law in the presence of the explicit listing of various qualifications

¹ *General Comment No. 10: Freedom of expression (Art. 19) 29/06/1983.*

<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/CCPRGeneralCommentNo10.pdf>

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Handyside v. United Kingdom, 5493/72 [1976]* <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57499>

or exceptions to the right. It has been also demonstrated that the structure of free speech clauses in American free speech law differs from the structure of freedom of expression in ICCPR and ECHR. The tendency at the international level especially after the World War II has been away from abstract statement, towards more detailed formulations of freedom of speech. This leads to a conclusion that demand for an absolute status for freedom of speech, which is confined basically to systems with no literal restrictions clause, such as America's First Amendment, does not arise with the ICCPR and ECHR, which include explicit limitations on the speech. The divergence between American law and the system in international level in the field of freedom of expression extends to the methodology of restricting freedom of speech. While the American free speech adjudication is obsessed with categorization, the international law of freedom of speech, as the above discussion revealed, inclines to balance freedom of expression interests against other social values.

November, 2015

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