23.06.2011THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF THE TURKISH-GEORGIAN “CULTURAL” DIALOGUE
Expert, Center for the Armenian Studies, “Noravank” Foundation, Candidate of Sciences (History)
Introduction
Recently the issue of poor condition of the cultural monuments on the territory of Turkey and Georgia and the necessity of their restoration has stirred up. There is a pre-history: back in 2007 Turkey and Georgia initiated negotiations on this issue but the parties did not come to the agreement. Previous talks failed in a consequence of the opposition and efforts of the Georgian Patriarch Ilya II. Due to the public authority (according to the public opinion polls 90% of the respondents trust in the Georgian Orthodox Church and personally in the Patriarch) the later managed to put a veto and to prevent the conclusion of final agreement. The main reason was the concern that as a result of the agreement the Muslim factor and, naturally Turkish influence, would get stronger in Georgia. And the Georgian elite, especially the spiritual one, is well aware of the consequences it may have. As for the political elite, the later, of course, tries to maneuver between the Turkish demands on the one hand, and demands of the Georgian society and spiritual authorities on the other. It is obvious that the pliability of the political authorities of the country is conditioned by the strategic partnership with Turkey, continuous growth of the Turkish investments in the Georgian economy, and why not, by adopting short-term tactics in this issue. In case of adopting long-term strategy by the Georgian authorities it would have been at least obvious to them today that it is necessary to oppose Turkey’s claims, and at the same time that making concessions may have disastrous effect for the territorial integrity of the country.
Despite all this, the revival of the unfinished negotiations was initiated by the efforts of the Georgian side. Thus, in April 2011 during his visit to Turkey the Foreign Minister of Georgia G. Vashadze spoke about the unfinished negotiations and hoped that in the near future the parties would manage to come to an agreement on that issue. The Georgian party explains its eagerness by the circumstance that on the territory of Turkey the so-called “Georgian” churches of Tao-Klarjeti are in a poor condition and this issue needs to be solved urgently. Let us mention that here we speak about four Medieval monuments – Oshkvank, Ishkhan, Khandza and Otkhta, which are today on the territory of Turkey. The Georgia party expects that they will be passed to Georgia in order to carry out restoration works. This claim is substantiated by that fact that the Armenian Surb Khach (St. Cross) Church was restored without participation of real proprietors – the Armenian party, which has its negative effect. In its turn, in exchange for such concessions, Turkey demands consent of Georgia for the restoration of three mosques in Samtskhe-Javakhq, Akhltskha and Kobuleti as well as building of one new mosque and Turkish bath in Batumi.
It is remarkable that the details of the negotiations are kept secret from the Georgian public. The first public statement was made by M. Saakashvili during the live teleconference on January 26, 20111. In his address the president also mentioned that Georgia was a democratic country and the Muslims living there had a right to follow their national traditions. And the Minister of Culture of Georgia N. Rurua at the beginning of this year stated that the conditions would be published only after the signing of the protocols2. The Georgian authorities, using the state propaganda machinery, spread the viewpoint that this is only a cultural issue and has no religious nature. The secrecy of the negotiations as well as scrappy information about the content of the negotiations which appeared in the press caused both the discontent of the Georgian Orthodox church and Georgian society. Taking into consideration the poor experience in the past, the secular Georgian authorities, headed by the president M. Saakashivili, in fact, this time try to bypass the spiritual authorities and to come to an agreement with the Turks behind their back. As justly observes Georgian expert G. Nodia, this issue is a cornerstone of contradictions between the Georgian Orthodox Church and secular authorities3.
The importance of those negotiations is in the fact that the considered issue, being cultural only at the first sign, in reality is not only a religious but also a political one.
The agreement from the point of view of Georgian benefits
The Turkish party, in fact, is ready to pass Oshkvank, Ishkhan, Khandza and Otkhta Medieval monuments, which are on the territory of Turkey, to the Georgians for the restoration. But the point is that the two of the aforementioned churches – Ishkhan and Oshvank, are the Armenian Chalcedon cultural monuments. They are not a part of the Georgian cultural heritage.
Let us bring some extracts from chapter “The Architectural Monuments of Tayq” of a book “At the wellsprings of the Armenian Classical Architecture” (2003) by Doctor of Architecture T. Marutyan: “Tayq and its medieval monuments, including Iskhan and Banak built in the 7th century, such wonderful monuments as Khukhuvank, Oshvank, built in the 10th century, and many other monuments are the fruits of the Armenian creative mind and there is nothing to argue about”4. Then T. Marutyan based on many sources consecutively proves his point of view. E.g. it is suffice to mention N. Marr’s evidence based on the Georgian sources, which is mentioned in his book: “In the 9th and even 10th century Georgian monks in Tayq and Kkhardjk were surrounded by their coreligionists but they were of other nation – Armenians” 5. Marutyan mentions: “till the last quarter of the 11th century Tayq was populated by the Chalcedon Armenians and this region is an integral part of Great Armenia”6.
Correspondingly, Georgian and Turkish parties are partially negotiating about the Armenian cultural heritage in Turkey too.
Georgian party considers those churches Georgian, substantiating this only by the inscriptions in Georgian made on the churches. The inscriptions in Georgian are explained by the fact that the church rites among the Chalcedon Armenians in that region were held in Georgian. And it is obvious that the inscription for the Chalcedon churches built for the Armenian community were in Georgian.
Thus, this Turkish-Georgian agreement proceeds from the Georgian interests because they manage to proclaim publicly that those monuments are Georgian, which falls within the logic of the Georgian cultural and historic claims. But Georgian interests and achievements are restricted to that. Here one detail is important: if the aforementioned monuments are restored as Georgian, the liturgy will not be served there due to a simple reason that there are no adherents of the Georgian Orthodox Church there. Thus, the restored “Georgian” churches in Turkey will acquire the status of cultural monuments and not working religious facilities. So such an “achievement” cannot be of religious or political importance for Georgia. After the restoration, but being inactive, the history of those churches or even the churches too will fall into oblivion.
The agreement from the point of view of Turkish benefits
The situation is different for Turkey. So, according to the variant of the agreement which is being discussed, Turkey will acquire a right to restore mosques in Samtskhe-Javakhq, Akhltskha and Kobuleti and to build a new mosque and a bath in Batumi. The most important is the fact that they will be active religious facilities. This is the item which caused the discontent of the Georgia Orthodox Church. The activity of the Muslim religious organizations will, of course, serve to stirring up of the local Muslim elements, the strengthening of the Muslim world-outlook and, why not, the proselytism among the local Christians. And if those organizations have constant financial assist from Turkey, it will be clear what kind of bomb is planted on the territory of Georgia. The considerable part of the Georgian community which is opposing to this scenario has a serious concern that it will result in a kind of tension between the Muslims and Christians living in the country. This is the reason why the Georgian Patriarchate has already twice made statements (on January 18 and February 4) in which it was mentioned that signing of the protocols in the current condition was unacceptable.
The most dangerous for Georgia is considered to be the construction of a new mosque in Batumi – the capital of Adzharia.
Today, 30% of population of Adzharia is Muslims (the population is 376.016, of which 115.161 are Muslims). They are Adzharians who are known as the Georgians who adopted Islam. At present they preserved their Georgian identity mainly due to the Georgian language, culture, Georgian environment and Georgian citizenship. In past, during the Russian-Turkish wars the Muslims from Adzharia mainly supported Turks. Thus, during the Crimea war in 1853-1856 Adzharians rendered great assistance to the Turkish army and during the 1877-1878 Russian-Turkish war there were about 6000-10000 Adzharians, including high-ranking officers in the Turkish army7. And when the territory, by the decision of the Berlin summit, passed to Russia, many Adzharians moved to the territory of the Ottoman Empire (Muhajirs). The other part stayed at the territory of the Russian Empire where “Avengers” terrorist group was formed. The targets of the terrorist group were Russian officers and officials; they were mainly funded from the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain8.
Later, at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, alongside with the growth of the nationalist moods, pro-Turkish orientation got stronger among the Adzharians, pan-Turkic and pan-Islamist party was created and its aim was to join Turkey. At the same time, the local nationalist moods which pursued the idea of creation of independent Adzharia, stirred up.
Nevertheless, after declaring the independent Georgia in 1918, “The People’s Congress of Adzharia” in Batumi adopted pro-Georgian stance.
In past, they constituted 70% but recently, due to the efforts of the Georgian Orthodox Church a vast number of them have been reconverted to Christianity. Today there are a number of families in which the representatives of the older generation are Muslims and the younger generation is Christians. Under A. Abashidze Adzharia was almost independent from Tbilisi, but M. Saakashvili managed to put the end to the factual semi-independent status and to establish the authority of Tbilisi in Adzharia. However, Adzharia still preserves the status of autonomic republic which was guaranteed by the 1921 Moscow Treaty. The item 6 of the aforementioned document stipulated that Turkey is the guarantor of the Muslim majority living in Adzharia. This circumstance, as well as the presence of the Muslims in Adzharia, serves ground for the periodically manifested Turkish claims. They were more vividly manifested in Turkish media and expert community after the Georgian-Ossetian war in 2008. Thus, Hassan Ali Karasar, the expert at SETA, immediately after the war presented extensive analysis9 in which he urged the Turkish authorities to stir up the Georgian direction of foreign policy, to reshape it, in particular, shifting from the approach from Tbilisi-oriented to multi-vector one and set direct ties with Adzharia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The expert mentions that Turkey is involved in the processes in the region in historical and demographic (here he means the Muslim population) aspects. He remembered with pain the fact when, after the events in 2004, M. Saakashvili’s cross (implying the new flag of Georgia) was placed on Adzharia’s flag to which Turkish media responded rather harshly. Particularly the segment which was close to the authorities blamed M. Saakashvili and called him chauvinist10, irresponsible person who used national and religious symbols without any restrictions11. Thus, according to one of the Turkish experts “the main problem of modern Georgia is marginalization of non-Christian population, as this new state is based on past and Christian values”12.
At present the conclusion of this kind of Georgian-Turkish agreement will be a prominent step in increasing of Islam and Turkish influence among the Muslim population of Adzharia (let us mention that the Muslims in Adzharia are Sunnites which is also an advantageous factor for the Turkish party).
In the same way the restoration of mosques in Samtskhe-Javakhq, Akhltskha and Kobuleti should be considered. They all will serve for strengthening the positions of Islam on the spot, which is not an equal worth concession on behalf of Georgia for the restoration of inactive monuments on the territory of Turkey.
Conclusion
For Georgia undertaking the restoration of the Armenian churches of Tayq, in fact, declaration them as a part of Georgian culture, is a cultural achievement because this church should have a status not of an active church but status of a monument. But in exchange for this concession Turkey will get 4 mosques in the vulnerable regions of Georgia which will be a great political achievement for Turkey and great political defeat of Georgia.
It is not difficult to forecast that in a consequence of the activity of the mosques the stances of Islam on the territory of Georgia will get stronger. So, this supposedly “cultural” initiative has definite political purposes. Opposing of the Georgian Patriarchate to this agreement is not only in Georgian interests but also in Armenian ones.
If the agreement is concluded in the form which is today submitted for the negotiations, it becomes obvious that Turkey will appear in the most profitable position. Turks estimated everything clearly – on the one hand passing of the Armenian Chalcedon churches to Georgia will cause new tension in the complicated Armenian-Georgian relations which are especially tensed in religious issues and issues connected with the churches. But the Turkish estimations are not restricted to that. On the other hand it will considerably strengthen Turkish influence in the domestic live in Georgia. The mosques in Georgia, thus turning into a crucial weapon of Turkish expansionist policy, will threaten Georgian identity and territorial integrity.
1 http://www.chechenews.com/developments/2316-1.html
2 http://www.blackseanews.net/read/10343
3 See Nodia G., Georgia's Showdown Between Church And State, 20.02.2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/commentary_georgia_churches/2314963.html
4 Օշկվանքի նորոգման գործը հանձնված է Վրաստանին, 27.11.2008, http://noravank.am/arm/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=2452&sphrase_id=5051&print=Y
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
7 Asari Moin, Islamic Emirates of Tiflis-Georgia: Ajara & Meskhetia, Feridun, 21.08.2008, http://lahoreledger.com/?p=8154
8 Ibid
9 Hasan Ali Karasar, Sahakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, Policy Brief, August, 2008, http://www.setav.org
10 Hakan Albayrak, “Saakaşvili ve Şovenist Siyasetin İflası,” Yeni Şafak, 11 August 2008. – reference by Hasan Ali Karasar, Sahakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, Policy Brief, August, 2008, http://www.setav.org
11 İbrahim Karagьl, “Bir Delinin Başımıza Aзtığı Belaya Bakın,” Yeni Şafak, 12 August 2008. – reference by Hasan Ali Karasar, Sahakashvili Pulled the Trigger: Turkey between Russia and Georgia, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research, Policy Brief, August, 2008, http://www.setav.org
12Bayram Balci, Is there a place for Islam in Mikhael Saakashvili’s Christian Georgia? http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=177Return
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- ARMENIAN SCHOOLS IN TBILISI: THE END OF THE STORY [16.01.2012]
- ARMENIANS OF TBILISI: NEW REALITIES [14.04.2011]
- PECULIARITIES OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE NATIONAL IDENTITY[20.10.2010]
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